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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 “Please stop killing us, that’s it!” — “The people on YouTube are not killing you, so…” 
This was the beginning of a contentious exchange between a white male YouTube and Twitch 
Streamer for the Zach and Matt Show and a Black woman-of-color protestor. It was live-
streamed from the George Floyd and Breonna Taylor protests in Washington D.C. 
 Just moments before the argument began, the two had been watching a small group of 
protestors expressing their outrage on a window with “Fuck 12” written on it. As the streamer 
pans the camera around, a hand goes up to block the lens. Then an off-camera speaker asks, “Is 
this for a news organization?”. The streamer replies obliviously, “So you’re currently on You-
Tube, and there’s twenty-eight thousand people watching”—The camera starts to point at the off-
camera person, and the off-camera person continues to use their hands to block the camera. It’s 
appears to be a woman of color. She is wearing a mask, but uses both hands to shield her face 
from the camera— “So if you want to shout out your instagram, have at it!” She responds em-
phatically, “I don’t!” After a few moments, and as the camera follows her she says, “Please stop 
killing us, that’s it!”, and the streamer quickly responds in contestation, “The people on YouTube 
aren’t killing you, so…” She retorts with, “So it’s ok to watch us when we are like protesting and 
stuff, but you don’t want to stand with us.” The streamer’s white fragility begins to show as he 
says “she is going to make him upset”. He tries to legitimize himself and his frustration at her 
words by explaining that earlier in the day he had been shot by rubber bullets. The woman of 
color dismisses him, and then he calls her a bitch. As the crowd comes to her defense, he contin-
ues to record. A tussle ensues, and viewers can hear her say that “he’s not here to protest”. An-
other person of color emerges from the crowd to rescue the streamer, and the woman of color he 
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had been arguing with says, “If you are on our side, then shut up and give us the mic!” His re-
sponse is a veiled threat. “Twenty-eight thousand people seeing you behave like an idiot!” She 
responds, “and twenty-eight thousand people seeing you behave like a racist dumbass!” Earlier 
that week, The Zach and Matt Show was criticized because the same host explained to viewers 
on Twitch that he was attending the protests to film violence. 
 This vignette shows the precariousness of the online space for people of color. The 
streamer repeatedly tried to film the woman’s face despite her dismay at being filmed. In addi-
tion, the streamer’s intentions for attending the protests are made clear by his suggestion that she  
“shout out” her instagram handle to his twenty-eight thousand viewers. He is clout chasing in-
stead of protesting, and, in the process of doing so, he is exploiting the struggle of people of col-
or and putting them directly in danger. He cannot understand or refuses to acknowledge that by 
broadcasting people of color’s faces during the protests he puts them at a higher risk of suffering 
their oppressors’ ire. And when the very people of color he seeks to exploit make him confront 
his white privilege, he lashes out. He makes it clear that his twenty-eight thousand followers are 
a weapon that may be exacted upon the woman of color who confronts him. 
 Similar behaviors are practiced at all levels and corners of society. Even the forty-fifth 
President of the United States participated in this type of weaponization of digital content. On 
Friday, June 26th, 2020, former President Donald Trump tweeted “wanted posters” for protester. 
Those featured in the tweets were alleged to have removed a statue near the Whitehouse. By 
posting those photos, the former President engaged in the same weaponization of his followers as 
the streamer for the Zack and Matt Show. He knew that his millions of followers could not assist 
him to locate the individuals in his posts. His tweet was a threat to those who allegedly toppled 
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the statue and those who are considering any tangible form of resistance: All eyes are on you! 
Those who took the photos are equally as complicit; in their eagerness to exploit the struggle of 
people of color, they deliver Black people into the hands of their oppressors. 
 The constants in this cycle of online disprivacy, a term that I believe more accurately de-
scribes the condition and commodity that results from these situations, are the white voyeur and 
the bodies of people of color. When an institution or person exposes and exploits a person of col-
or, such as in the case of trauma porn (Kanengo 2020), they are creating a commodity. The aim is 
not to invade privacy to gain some thing. The thing that is sought, traded, and sold is the dispri-
vacy itself. We need to understand how people of color exist in the online space, which violates, 
exploits, and then disregards them. We need to understand how people of color negotiate partici-
pation and privacy strategies in the online space. How do they find or create safety? How do they 
react when they become the targets of violence in the digital space?  Do they seek allyship? This 
research seeks to investigate these questions. 
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
The Inception and Initial Conception of the Online Space (1969 - 1989) 
 The first iteration of the internet was developed at the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA), and so it is named the ARPA network (ARPANET). The impetus for the cre-
ation of ARPA and ARPANET directs us to a guiding prominence of governmental aims. ARPA 
was created as a sub-agency of the Department of Defense (DoD) in 1958. The agency was a di-
rect response to the increasing distrust between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the mid Cold 
War period. In response to the launch of the soviet space probe Sputnik I, the DoD created ARPA 
with the expressed mission to develop cutting edge technology that would baffle adversaries 
(Lukasik 2011, 6). Once NASA was established in 1959 to support U.S. aims for space in a non-
defense manner, ARPA focused on terrestrial technologies. In 1961 DoD named former MIT pro-
fessor Jack Ruina to head ARPA, and the ARPA mission was updated in 1962 to “support re-
search on the conceptual aspect of command and control and to provide a better understanding of 
organizational, informational, and man-machine relationships” (7). To support the new mission, 
Ruina hired many new but respected staff from academia and government. These new members, 
which included J.C.R. Licklider, Robert Taylor, Larry Roberts, and Paul Baran, conceptualized 
what would come to be known as a “network” to eliminate redundancy and mend dysfunction 
between ARPA teams and those who relied upon their information and research. Thus, the work 
on ARPANET began. 
 The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) also encouraged real world application of 
ARPA’s networking research. Officially known as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in 
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, the 1963 LTBT notably does not outright 
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prohibit tests of nuclear weapons underground. The treaty stipulates that underground tests are 
only banned if they will pollute neighboring nations with radioactive materials (Article I). Unfor-
tunately, there was no reliable way to discern underground tests from tremors at the time, and the 
U.S. Nuclear Test Detection Office was interested in using ARPA to figure out a means of reli-
able detection in order to negotiate a total ban. ARPA decided seismic arrays (sensor systems 
which could differentiate between earthquakes and underground testing) would be the best solu-
tion. In 1969, while ARPA worked on the Vela program’s seismic arrays, the ARPANET came 
online with four connected computers within the U.S. The use of ARPANET to network with the 
Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) and the National Physics Laboratory in London quickly 
followed (Njølstad 2007, 666; Bing 2009, 28). Both network connections were complete by 
1972, and the first signs of an internet, a truly online space, emerge. 
 ARPANET was not publicly announced until 1972 at the first International Conference 
on Computer Communications (ICCC), but many other networks were already underway. How-
ever, the public, having become increasingly concerned about privacy on the nascent internet, 
demanded answers. The root of the publics’ concern about U.S. computer networks stemmed 
from the National Data Center controversy of the 1960s. In 1965, the U.S. government an-
nounced that it would centralize multiple databases which were formed of data gathered from the 
public since the advent of computers. Once the public understood the extent to which the gov-
ernment collected individuals’ information — billions of data points, public outrage soon fol-
lowed (S. Rep. No. 62-032 1971). People were worried about being targeted for their political 
activism, religious beliefs, and even for their household spending habits. Specifically of political 
activism, and with the  FBI’s response to the civil rights movement on his mind, author Arthur R. 
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Miller remarked in the 1971 senate judiciary constitutional rights subcommittee hearing on Fed-
eral Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights that: 
The development of dossiers on people pursuing lawful social and political activi-
ty simply bears little relationship to the function of the military, even during peri-
ods of social unrest, especially when many of the people being scrutinized are ex-
tremely unlikely to engage in any unlawful activity, and when the selection of 
surveillance suspects seems to be motivated by what must simply be called an in-
credibly simplistic view of who are the good guys and who are the bad guys, who 
wears a white hat and who wears a black hat. (S. Rep. No. 62-032, 10) 
 The heated debates of the mid 60s and early 70s resulted in only two substantive legisla-
tive changes: the “Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968”, which limits wiretap 
for policing, and the “Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1971”, which assigned the right to notice of 
negative impacts to credit standing to the public (S. Rep. No. 35-024, 1974, 4). The issue of pri-
vacy became more complicate when the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC), 
which maintained and networked information for law enforcement, gave out “erroneous data” 
repeatedly which resulted in brutality, arrest, and warrants for innocent people (Licklider and 
Vezza 1978; Hand 1982). 
 In the 1975 senate judiciary committee’s science, technology, and commerce subcommit-
tee hearings on surveillance technology, ARPA and computer experts could not agree on the se-
curity of domestic data from ARPANET: “The public version of the research network is the 
APRAnet, a system linking Universities, military bases, and think tanks. The CIA, NSA, and 
DIA also use the ARPAnet, but ARPA officials insist it is not used for surveillance purposes. 
Computer experts, however, say that anyone with a terminal, a telephone, and the proper identi-
fication passwords, can access the ARPAnet. Several experts said that the ARPAnet could be ex-
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panded by the telephone, to include other Government agencies.” (Surveillance Technology 
1975, 13). 
 In essence, any government agency could utilize ARPAnet by simply recruiting a creden-
tialed person. This did not help ease the public’s concerns over privacy expressed in the prior 
hearings. The message was loud and clear: the public was being watched; computers were facili-
tating the storage of massive amounts of citizen data; and networks would allow for expansive 
access (H. Doc. No. 63-552, 1976; Krauss 2011). 
 In 1979, the University of Wisconsin made a proposal to the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) to develop its own network. ARPA researchers and staff had been emailing, file sharing, 
and logging in remotely for years by that time, and other researchers wanted parity. The network 
would provide non-DoD associated researchers with a means of swift, reliable communication, 
information sharing, and hardware access. This initial proposal for the Computer Science Re-
search Network (CSNET) was rejected. Of the three major considerations provided, the most 
surprising was the “belief that the CSNET project was proposing to reinvent ARPANET technol-
ogy; this perception was reinforced by the lack of any gateway between the ARPANET and the 
proposed CSNET” (Denning, Hearn, and Kern 1981, 4). In the review process for the proposal, 
CSNET was directed to use ARPA technologies. The project was approved on this and one addi-
tional condition: that NSF appoint a project manager for CSNET to direct the network for its first 
two years of operation. While the result of this behavior by NSF is generally seen as a positive, 
the ARPA backed TCP/IP protocols (these protocols govern how computers "talk" to each other) 
are still in use today, NSF’s demands killed an opportunity to conceptualize the internet without 
government interference. Requiring the use of TCP/IP and a connection to ARPANET assured 
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the government control and access to all research done on CSNET (free access by ARPA re-
searchers was also a requirement), but it eliminated an opportunity for reflexivity. In other 
words, the ideas of CSNET were stifled under the NSF’s necessity for structures akin to govern-
mental hierarchy (Rogers 1998, 215-216). The effects of this decision are immeasurable because 
this allowed ARPANET to define the technologies, protocols, policies, and norms of the wider 
internet. We still employ many of those ARPANET standards today. The Computer Science Net-
work (CSNET) came online in 1981 to much excitement within the scientific community. The 
passing of the baton from ARPA to the NSF seemingly marked a significant break from the men-
tality that created the early internet, and in 1989, five years after the establishment of the Nation 
Science Foundation Network (NSFNET), ARPANET was shut down. 
 The first iteration of the internet was the ARPANET; it was conceptualized and created 
without the input or knowledge of the public. The network was created to fulfill the premiere se-
curity needs of the government during the Cold War. As the internet grew and diversified, the 
ARPANET remained the backbone of the online space. Scientific, commercial, and military all 
coexisted in the same online space, and thus the rules of the primary owner became the norms of 
the latter. During the rise of the online space there are three recognizable trends that emerge: the 
guiding prominence of governmental aims, public pessimism about online privacy, and technol-
ogy gatekeeping. Robert Kahn, the inventor of the networking protocols on which the modern 
internet rely, predicted before the first International Computer Communications Conference 
(ICCC) that “the social implications of this field are a matter of widespread interest that reaches 
society in almost all walks of life; education, medicine, research, business and government” 
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(Kahn 1972; RFC371). For the first decades of the internet, and an online space, the potential for 
these changes, foreseen by Kahn, was stifled. 
 The internet existed, and arguably still exists, in two forms: the network of the state and 
the network of the people. Since the inception of the online space, these two forms intermingle, 
support, and compete with each other. Presently, the use of the online space as entertainment, 
education, and expression is dominant; many perceive the internet as liberating. Conversely, the 
dawn of the internet, and the online space, supported U.S. security aims and was seen as an ex-
clusive space. The initial digital divide was purely access because the government wholly con-
trolled the technology, infrastructure, research, and people who could access the internet. 
Urban Minorities and Digital Privacy (1967-2001) 
 Urban areas are defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as “Urbanized Areas (UAs) of 50,000 
people or more” and “Urban Clusters (UCs) of at least 2,500 and less than 50,000 people” (US 
Census Bureau 2020). In everyday speech, urban conjures images of high-density commercial 
high rises. However, for some it summons images of impoverished Black communities. For the 
purposes of this research, minority is broadly defined as a certain minority status and otherness 
which includes racial, sexual,  political, and religious minorities. This allows for an investigation 
that is critical, intersectional, and discursively open. While not explicitly referenced as urban mi-
norities, these peoples who are othered by the majority have been forced to negotiate privacy in 
the online space from nearly the inception of the online space. ARPANET and the various net-
works it spawned were direct products of the espionage aims of a Cold War mentality. This men-
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tality necessitated surveillance and action internally as much as it did externally. While the DoD 
surveilled Russians using the ARPANET, the FBI monitored people in the homeland. 
 The precedence of monitoring urban minorities using computer technologies began with 
the Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) in 1959. The program was established at the 
snap of the Cold War as an anti-communist effort. However, the targets of the programs new sur-
veillance methods and technologies were familiar social others. J. Edgar Hoover specifically 
crafted COINTELPRO operations to spy on Black and Indigenous rights groups, women’s rights 
groups, immigrant rights groups, and LGBT rights groups (Johnson 2006). The methods of the 
program were highly controversial but unknown to the public. Surveillance was the least of the 
operations. FBI agents operating under COINTERLPRO directives intimidated, coerced, and tor-
tured members of the Black Panther Party and other groups (Taylor 2019). These were methods 
that were developed in cohort with the CIA in their efforts to undermine Vietcong resistance 
(Packard 2020). Although many in government became weary of the program in its later years, 
most saw the program as a huge success. J. Edgar Hoover was granted extreme autonomy by leg-
islators and was unabashed in his extensive use of power (Hoerl and Ortiz 2015; Steve 2018). 
 COINTELPRO operations were formally ceased in 1971, one year before Hoover’s 
death, because of investigations into the killings of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark. Fred Hamp-
ton was a young activist that who through his work in the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP) and Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP) excited 
the Black (Power) Liberation Movement in Illinois. After he became the State Chairman of the 
Illinois BPP, the FBI identified him as an unacceptable aberrant and devised a method to manipu-
late and assassinate him (Churchill and Wall 1990). Mark Clark was also a rising star targeted by 
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the FBI and Hoover explicitly. He was also assassinated on December 4, 1969 while on security 
duty that night at the Hampton residence. Information on many organizations including the BPP 
were some of the first to be kept in national databases and utilized to carry out missions. This 
included the floor plans of Hampton’s home which had been charted by a FBI mole who had in-
filtrated the BPP. The following is an account of that night from the African American Heritage 
government archives website: 
On the evening of December 3, 1969, William O’Neal, who was employed by the 
FBI to infiltrate the BPP, slipped a powerful sleeping drug into Hampton’s drink 
then left. Officers were dispatched to raid his apartment. They stormed in and 
opened fire, killing his security guard. Then they opened fire on Hampton’s bed-
room where he laid unconscious from the drug with his sleeping, almost nine-
month-pregnant fiancee. After the gunfire, he was found to only be wounded and 
not dead. Upon that discovery, an officer shot him twice in his head and killed 
him. The remaining seven Panthers who were not killed were all arrested and in-
dicted by a grand jury on charges of attempted murder, armed violence, and a va-
riety of weapons charges. These charges were eventually dropped when during a 
later investigation, it was discovered that Chicago Police fired ninety-nine shots 
while the Panthers only shot once. (USNARA 2020, para. 2) 
 This is one of many examples of the blatant illegal actions by the FBI as part of COIN-
TELPRO operations. It is also simply one example of how new data management and dissemina-
tion techniques allowed the FBI to coordinate domestic attacks against urban minorities on U.S. 
soil. The ensuing investigations led to the end of COINTELPRO in disgrace. Pyle (1974 cited in 
Packard 2020) identifies the FBI COINTELPRO operations as drivers of networking technolo-
gies because the FBI wanted a service that would allow for expedient retrieval of whole records, 
but also in a ordered format that allowed easier information analysis. 
 The Nation Crime Information Center was the answer to their calls, literally. Established 
in 1967, two years before ARPANET, under the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) 
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Division, NCIC is another infamous creation of Hoover’s mind. Once the ARPANET was opera-
tional, a police officer could call into an NCIC access point to confirm “hits” on suspected crimi-
nals. The central database was established to keep a record of criminals, criminal histories, miss-
ing persons, theft, and anything else that was deemed pertinent by the agency. Notably, there was 
no centralized oversight of the information contributed to the NCIC databases. Participation in 
the system was voluntary, and the agencies were responsible for “the accuracy, timeliness, and 
completeness of the record” (Hand 1982, 508). 
 The inaccuracy of records became a huge issue by the 1980s. NCIC records were notori-
ously unreliable, but also suspiciously and conveniently inaccurate. It was not out of the ordinary 
to have a person arrested on a “hit” that was not valid, either because it had been cleared or be-
cause it never existed in the first place. Most often these occurred on people who were driving in 
vehicles or out on the streets. The police would run license plates or other information they re-
ceived from the person through the NCIC and receive confirmation. Arrest would ensue, but 
eventually some cases went to court to argue that people’s fourth amendment rights were being 
violated. One such case was that of Harold Decuir in People v. Decuir in Decatur, Illinois. Drug 
charges against Decuir were dropped on the interpretation that his fourth amendment rights were 
violated because he was stopped because of a two-month outdated NCIC hit (502). If the infor-
mation was erroneous, then the search was illegal. This was the argument. Hand (1982) takes a 
selection of cases to demonstrate the various failures of the NCIC and recommends changes to 
policy and protocol. Hand and other studies like it (Hemphill 1974) do not cite race or minority 
status because that is usually not listed in lawsuit proceedings. However, combined with the ac-
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tions of COINTELPRO, the NCIC arguably disproportionately affected Black people, women, 
and immigrants during the 1970s and 1980s. 
 When it became apparent that the fourth amendment would not be sufficient to protect 
people  with the rapid advances of computer and networking technology, digital privacy as an 
independent concept came to the forefront. Philip Zimmerman, a renowned computer scientist 
known for his development of cryptographic technologies, argued for the rights of individuals in 
the online space by arguing that: “It’s personal. It’s private. And it’s no one’s business but 
yours.” (original 1991, updated 1999). This sounds more like a chant at a protest or a rally cry for 
battle, and for many it was. Zimmerman was no stranger to activism, and he understood that 
there would only be one way to attain digital privacy: the people needed to take it. Zimmerman 
and others saw the unsuccessful attempts to convince legislators to reign in the power of sur-
veillance organizations and limit the scope of national databases. They knew that government 
would not act to stifle its own increasing power. Even more quagmiring was the fact that the in-
ternet was on the verge of its privatization boom (at the time of Zimmerman’s first work on pri-
vacy). The government was concerned about pushback from business with which it had part-
nered for years to built the internet. 
 Zimmerman responded by creating an email encryption method that is still unbroken. 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) was developed as a technological answer to the question of digital 
privacy. And when the government tried to deny the right of citizens to use the technology, Zim-
merman took them to court. The government did not want to allow powerful methods of encryp-
tion that for which they did not already possess “back doors” (Department of State Bureau of 
Politico-Military Affairs 1993). In fact, the government tried to step in between citizens and pri-
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vacy by using the appeal of encryption. The Clinton administration repeatedly created campaigns 
to co-create computer chips that would handle encryption for people and devices. For people, the 
purported benefit would be encryption. For the government, the benefit was a known backdoor in 
every sign chip produced. During this time period the government popularized the escrow 
method of encryption key management. If they could not manage a back-door exploit, they 
would make sure that they possessed a valid encryption key for every chip. In essence, the gov-
ernment pushed for its interpretation of privacy in the online space: governmental cyber security. 
This is despite the ever clear reality that non-authorized actors were gaining access to govern-
ment collected data through non-digital means (Hemphill 1974, 596). 
 Regardless the governments attempts to co-opt encryption and continue to define digital 
privacy, Zimmerman profoundly concluded that encryption technology was an excellent way to 
attain digital privacy — his PGP technologies are still unbreakable decades later, but the best 
technology was that of the mind. People needed to changer their behaviors and social expecta-
tions. This is because even if encryption became exploitable, if it remained sufficiently time con-
suming to carry out, the collective practice of using encryption would dissuade encryption crack-
ing as the primary means of obtaining people’s data. It would also reduce the rush to action 
which Michael Colaressi claims causes problems with policing and military action in the digital 
age (2020). 
 Zimmerman rightfully recognized that “advances in technology will not permit the main-
tenance of the status quo, as far as privacy is concerned” (Zimmerman 1999, para. 10). He postu-
lated that digital technologies would only allow for greater surveillance and controls by the gov-
ernment. Of the increasing predicament of digital privacy, Zimmerman wrote: “If we do nothing, 
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new technologies will give the government new automatic surveillance capabilities that Stalin 
could never have dreamed of” (para. 10). 
 By 2001, the controversy over encryption technology use by people in the U.S. was cool-
ing down. Partially because legislators were concerned about their own privacy in the online 
space, but also, because the September 11th attacks refocused security efforts extra-nationally. 
Also, because the government thought better to pursue more fundamental surveillance powers 
which would allocate them the funds, technology, time, and purview to access whatever they 
wanted. The Patriot Act was on the horizon. This effectively ended the discussion about encryp-
tion because in most cases under the new powers of surveillance there was no need to ask for ac-
cess, nor a right to privacy technologically (Patriot Act of 2001). 
 People of color have always been the target of neo-surveillance that was spawned by the 
rise of computer and networking technologies. This is because people of color, and other minori-
ties, became increasingly interested in communist-socialist theory in the post-war period. Mi-
norities recognized the inadequacies of the current governmental system to provide them with 
their basic needs. This frightened the federal government. In particular, the FBI played a central 
role in defining digital privacy for minorities. The agency’s interpretation was that there was no 
afforded privacy to these minorities; this is evidenced by their carte blanche operations. As tech-
nologies escaped the government’s grip, digital privacy became a reality. Digital privacy at least 
was correlated to encryption. However, it was soon recognized that social-behavioral norms that 
were adapted to invasive technologies represented the frontier of digital privacy. Philip Zim-
merman was a pioneer of both the technological and social constructions of digital privacy. The 
encryption technologies he created and the open-source development environment that he fos-
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tered are fundamental to an understanding of modern digital privacy. Having only penetrated so-
cial consciousness after the turn of the millennium, the concept of an actionable digital privacy is 
still relatively new. 
A New Millennium and the Divided Online Space 
 The modern digital divide is both a material and socially constructed problem. Digital 
divide was coined in the mid 1990s during the privatization boom of the internet after the intro-
duction of HTML and the World Wide Web technologies. However the term emerged, Manuel 
Castells (1996, 1997, 1998, 2004) postulated at length about the existence and potential effects of 
a divide in the online space; this is known to spawn the first order digital divide on access. The 
second order was theorized by DiMaggio and Hargittai (2001), Rogers (2001), Selwyn (2004), 
and van Djik (2005) who critiqued that access inaccurately framed the problems of people and 
the online space. Instead, these theorists borrow from literacy theory and argue that skill differ-
ences bifurcate the online space and create the digital divide. Lastly, there exists a third order 
where social and communal factors effect the “opportunities of meaningful use” by individuals 
(Warschauer 2003; Hilbert 2011; Moussa and Seraphim 2017). Ritzhaupt, Liu, Dawson, and Bar-
ron (2013) explain the third level as whether “users know how to use information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) for their personal empowerment”. This section of the literature review 
will delve deeper into the digital divide as it pertains to minorities.  It reveals that, while much 
work has been done to close the digital divide gap for minorities when it comes to access and 
skills, much more research needs to be done on the social influences of online access and use. 
	 16
 Initially, the digital divide was theorized as a small-t theory. Politicians of color and 
community members asserted the digital divide as a racial one. However, through the National 
Telecommunication and Information Administration's research, significant challenges to the the-
ory of digital divide as simply racial arose (National Telecommunications and Information Ad-
ministration 1999). Jæger (2004) analyzes two elderly internet access programs to identify elder-
ly populations as valid members of "the information society" (14); O'Neil and Baker (2003) take 
a similar approach in their assessment of "successful" family technology resource center pro-
grams in impoverished communities in Atlanta, Georgia. Liff and Shepherd (2004) examine the 
digital divide as a gender-based one, and Payton (2003) introduces sexual minorities to the di-
vide, along with intersecting race and gender: African-American women. Zhang and Wolff 
(2003) expand the digital divide to encompass the urban-rural spacial divide. The particular 
physical requirements of computers and the internet prompted Solomon (2000) to confront the 
digital divide from the perspective of persons with disabilities and create the "disability divide". 
Dobransky and Hargittai (2006) extend Solomon's work by examining usage cases amongst per-
sons with disabilities and the financial predicament in obtaining at-home access. Although all of 
these inquiries into the digital divide are founded on the assumption of the divide being one of 
material access, there are hints that the researchers recognized that skills differences represented 
a more complex problem despite access becoming more widespread (Payton 2003; O'Neil and 
Baker 2003, 308-311; Jaeger 2004). 
 DiMaggio and Hargittai (2001), while acknowledging fully the substantial digital access 
divide, refocus the debate on a skills perspective: "what are [people] able to do, when they go 
on-line" (4, emphasis in original). They also expanded the definition of the internet beyond sim-
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ply the hardware it runs on; instead, they argue for including the structures that result in the im-
plementation of the online space: profit-seeking corporations, government agencies, and non-
governmental organizations (4). DiMaggio and Hargittai challenge early dreams of an internet 
that spawns self-learning because of access (Licklider 1965). If anything, they reinforce later 
perspectives expressed by Licklider and Taylor(1968) and Lederberg (1978, 1317) on the possi-
bilities of technology becoming less understandable to everyday users as time goes on. Goedhart, 
Breorse, Kattouw, and Dedding (2019) echo this message in their focus on the digital divide as it 
affects immigrant mothers in Europe. In their study, they observe that incomplete ICT skills can 
negatively impact a mother’s usage of online communication despite having access, and the neg-
ative impacts can then extend to their children who are tasked with facilitating access. The skills 
divide between the mothers and their children upends the normal social dynamics between them. 
Geodhart, Breorse, Kattow, and Dedding demand that internet access programs include skills 
training, especially for vulnerable populations. Reisdorf and Rikard (2018) extend that argument 
to prisoners. They find that prisoners are not being equipped with the necessary skills to access 
the online space. This lag in digital skills can negatively impact recidivism, and thus, they argue 
for a “digital rehabilitation” where prisoners will be trained on the hard and soft skills of the in-
ternet to help them reintegrate into society. Skill inequalities are a huge issue and represent a 
large portion of the modern digital divide (van Deursen and van Djik 2011). The prevalence of 
the second-order digital divide is the result of an online space that is increasingly reliant on 
evermore complex technologies. Contrary to Licklider’s initial prediction that computers would 
help us make more sense of the world, digital technologies seem to have the opposite effect. 
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 The third order of the digital divide focuses on the online-offline social dynamic that in-
fluences internet use despite equal access and skill. Mehra, Merkel, and Bishop (2004) argue that 
conventional quantitative research on the digital divide is important and helpful, but they assert 
the importance of understanding the digital divide from the human perspective, “to understand 
the scruffy realities of marginalization in which internet use is embedded, the complex intertwin-
ing of sweeping socioeconomic processes and power dynamics with harsh everyday realities” 
(782). Their research looks at the use of online space by low-income persons, sexual minorities, 
and African-American women for self-actualization. Foley (2004) examines how access can help 
overcome offline social exclusion, while Schradie (2011) examines how the divide manifests dif-
ferent online cultures by examining the digital production gap. 
 The digital divide is still predominantly thought of as an issue of access, and there is 
much truth to this conceptualization. There are many people living in rural communities that still 
lack access or use subpar service. This includes many native people’s living on reservations in 
the U.S. (S. HRG. 116-116, 2019). However much research currently focuses on examining 
skills and social gaps in the online space in order to explain the persistence of a division between 
those who participate in the online space. The perspective of the digital divide has also changed. 
Instead of simply viewing the divide as the symptom of material and social problems, theorists 
are now examining the divide through a lens of causation; it is both the result of and influences 
social norms, economic trends, and culture in the offline space. 
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Urban Illinois Areas & the Digital Divide 
 Although Illinois is thought of as a high access state (at the time of writing, according to 
broadbandnow.com, which reports statistics on broadband internet access, Illinois has the 6th 
best broadband coverage), issues with equal access have warranted a reassessment of how the 
state is dealing with the digital divide (Taglang 2020). Covid-19 has also spawned a rethinking of 
what is meaningful access. Assuming widespread meaningful access because of the proliferation 
of mobile phones with data plans is unhelpful. Are students expected to use Zoom, take notes, 
and consult sources all on the same 6.5 inch device? Even before Covid-19, the state of Illinois 
announced a program to rethink the access divide (Hansen 2020). The first studies were set to 
begin in early 2020, but that progress is likely upended by working from home because those 
who were the foci of the research are thought to have no or slow internet connections. What is 
clear is that rural and some urban areas have a lack of access, and if they have access the service 
is substandard. 
 Access is even more complicated than previously thought because of where access is at-
tained. Many urban and rural students attain access by going to school or having access to a li-
brary. They may not be utilizing the internet at home despite a wired connection coming directly 
to their building. Some of the confusion over access results from the non-standard ways of deliv-
ering internet service — to the neighborhood, to the building, or to the node. 
 When it comes to digital skill attainment, the Chicago Public Schools system introduced 
programs quickly after the turn of the millennium (Consortium on Chicago School Research 
2007). The programs which were paired with new infrastructure are seen to be successful, but 
there is no way to know what level of user ability was attained by students or parents exposed to 
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the programs. There have been similar programs conducted downstate at universities and li-
braries. These are areas that need further study. However, they are outside the scope and focus of 
this research. 
Why not Cyber Security? 
 The online space's inception as a weapon of espionage impacts how stewards and users of 
the internet conceptualize safety. The foremost safety in the online space is found within cyber-
security theory which derives from traditional security theory. In the context of virtual privacy 
networks (VPN), Norton — one of the largest sellers of online protection tools, differentiates 
privacy as a means of "block[ing] websites, internet browsers, cable companies, and internet ser-
vice providers from tracking your information and your browser history" and security as some-
thing which "helps protect you from other people accessing your personal information and other 
data" (Gervais 2020). The differentiation of privacy as safety from companies and institutions 
and security as safety from other online actors is faulty. Even by notions definition of privacy, 
privacy would be included within security. By separating the two, it merely separates out those 
whom Norton, and many others in the industry, are comfortable assigning as manageable agents 
in the online space. The privacy-security bifurcation also mimics traditional notions of safety 
found within the national security framework. This section of the literature review explores the 
origin and operationalization of cybersecurity theory to highlight the lack of security perspec-
tives that compensate for the conceptualization of online safety as privacy. 
 Since the beginning of the internet, the online space has been conceived as securitizing 
and securitized. Initially, “internetworking”, how people referred to connected computers before 
	 21
the internet became the standard term, was a means of executing particular security endeavors. In 
its capacity as a tool, it was securitizing. Subsequently, the internet became an online space that 
was perceived to be secure to the extent that valuable communication and research could be con-
ducted within it. Thus, the internet itself became securitized. With the privatization and rapid ex-
pansion of the online space, that perception of the internet as secure has waned. Now, the percep-
tion is the online space in anarchical with bastions of security. In other words the online space is 
a microcosm, or exocosm, of the international community. For this reason, it is valid to draw 
parallels between security in the international context and cybersecurity — especially since na-
tional security was the impetus for the internet. 
 Traditional security, as a responsibility and a power, is abdicated upward from individuals 
to institutions. The highest institutional layer is the nation-state and thus the state wields unimag-
inable responsibility and power when it comes to security, usually of maintaining borders and 
preventing invasion. From the traditional security perspective, material factors are the primary 
determinants of preventing harm by an external actor or action (Buckley 1987; Buzan 1991; 
Levy 1995). This perspective of security comes directly from warfare strategy and dominated 
until the collapse of the U.S.S.R.; it "emphasizes military threats and the need for strong coun-
ters", status quo orientation, and the centrality of the state (Booth 1991). Cybersecurity adopts 
this same framework for assigning power, identifying manageable agents, and formulating tac-
tics. Private companies which dominate the cybersecurity and the public institutions that hire 
them have focused on centralized solutions that rely on expansive technological integration and 
superlative power: remote servers, firewalls, encryption. Cybersecurity operationalized in this 
way completely removes the ability of an individual to participate in the security process. 
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 Controversially, the traditional security approach has led to many high-profile cases of 
data breach (Fuller 2019). Cowley and Perlroth write about the cybersecurity strategies at various 
financial institutions: "MasterCard, for example, has a windowless bunker at its data center in 
Missouri, where a group of security experts work. Citigroup runs three cyberattack response cen-
ters - in Budapest, New York and Singapore - that give it round-the-clock coverage. JPMorgan 
Chase spends nearly $600 million a year on security, and Bank of America's chief executive has 
said the bank's security team has a ‘blank check’ for its spending" (Cowley and Perlroth 2019). 
 Appropriating Fuller's term, the immense investment born out of realist notions of securi-
ty have been ineffective in combatting cyberinsecurity (Amir, Levi, and Tsafrir 2018; Talesh 
2017). Just as with the military industrial complex, there is a vicious cycle that is promoting se-
curity behavior which has not realized an actual benefit to individuals but has the positive exter-
nality of making a lot of people wealthy. 
 One contributing factor to the increase in cyberinsecurity is the growing amount of in-
formation that is being shared purposefully or inadvertently by individuals with institutions. Nor-
ton's official site identifies the unnoticed movement of individuals' data beyond the initial institu-
tion which gathered it as a breach of privacy despite it not being a breach of security (Gervais 
2020). This shows that there is a unexplored aspect of safety in the online space which could po-
tentially yield great benefit, but there is a disincentive to explore it because doing so would dis-
rupt the status quo of individuals relinquishing information to institutions. Taking into considera-
tion the preference of the aforementioned in theorizing security, this thesis centers individuals 
instead of institutions, and therefore focuses on digital privacy instead. 
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 As an aside, I advocate for the use of the term safety instead of privacy or security. Be-
cause privacy focuses on addressing weaknesses to exploitation by institutions and security for 
other users, they do not fully capture the predicament of people of color in the online space. Peo-
ple of color are not simply in danger of exploitation by one or the other, they are potentially vio-
lated in the online space by systems, institutions, and other persons all at the same time. Fur-
thermore, security is not effective when trying to understand the perceptions and motivations of 
individuals because security technologies in the online space are increasingly unavailable to in-
dividuals, the hardware is expensive and the technologies are difficult to implement and main-
tain. And privacy does not capture the stakes for people of color in the online environment. They 
are not simply trying to keep something unviewable or unknowable for trivial or financial rea-
sons. Increasingly, they are put in potentially dangerous situations because of their exploitation 
and exposure in the online environment. People of color in the online environment are looking to 
attain and maintain the human right of safety in the online space, and in many cases, it is sub-
stantially challenged. 
Theories of Digital Privacy 
 Because this study examines digital privacy strategies as they are affected by a racial 
digital divide, I use a justice framework on digital privacy developed by Ashworth and Free 
(2006) to make sense of participants privacy protection motivations. They formulate a justice 
theory of digital privacy which identifies two main components to perceptions of privacy in the 
online environment: distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice is characterized by “a 
perceived fairness of the allocation of outcomes and is assumed to reflect a concern for one’s ma-
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terial well-being” (113); thought, there is a distinction between what is seen as fair and what is 
seen as advantageous (114). Procedural justice is the perception that decision making within a 
group has involved members to “the extent that it communicates to relevant individuals that they 
are valued and respected members of the organization” (113). Within procedural justice, open-
ness, information access, permission, and honesty are foundational. When companies do not 
meet the expectations of online users in regards to three areas, the sense of procedural justice 
dissolves (116). Without distributive or procedural justice, people in the online space feel that 
their privacy has been violated and seek recourse. 
 To understand people’s behavior after they feel that their privacy has been compromised, 
I appropriate the privacy behavioral model developed by Chen, Beaudoin, and Hong (2016). 
They have identified four behavioral categories rooted in risk avoidance behavioral theories of 
approach and avoidance (Piko 2001; Youn 2009): privacy setting, contact management, access 
setting, and identity masking (Chen, Beaudoin, Hong 2016, 418). Privacy setting involves clear-
ing or limiting one’s digital footprint via actions “such as clearing cookies and browser history, 
encrypting communication, deleting previous postings, and avoiding websites that ask for a real 
name” (418). Contact Management is when the user blocks users they have already become 
friends with, refuse friend or follow requests, and ask others to take down content which features 
them. Access setting restricts “sensitive” content to trusted members of an online community, 
and lastly, Identity masking is using an alias to conceal oneself from organizations, companies, 
and other users. 
 The objective of this research is to investigate how the digital divide affects perceptions 
of justice in the online space and how those different perceptions of justice result in variance in 
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digital privacy behaviors amongst urban minorities. I examine from the perspective elaborated in 
the literature review; the internet has and continues to be a dangerous space for urban minorities. 
The primary use of the online space has been for surveillance and oppression of urban minorities.  
The current public sentiment of an internet of freedom and expressivity contrasts greatly with 
that of the government. This can be seen in agency actions, legislative efforts, and legislator 
spawned discourse on the internet, security, and privacy. 
 As a note, there are two pandemics that currently affect this research: the global Covid-19 
pandemic, which began in January of 2020, and the pandemic of racism that persists in this coun-
try. The global Covid-19 pandemic has already claimed the lives of more than six-hundred thou-
sand persons, with no end in sight. There are almost fifteen million infected, and the number con-
tinues to rise. In the U.S. specifically, we are nearing one-hundred thousand new cases daily. For 
the racial pandemic, there also does not seem to be an end in sight. Most recently the nationwide 
George Floyd and Breonna Taylor protests spread from large cities to even the most intolerant 
crevices of our country. Notably, thousands marched on Washington D.C. to let the forty-fifth 
President of the United States, Donald Trump, know that they will not stand for the unjust police 
killings against people of color in this country. These pandemics have been ongoing during the 
period of research and undeniably impact how people are perceiving the world and themselves. 
Although it was not initially my intent to explore digital privacy during a moment where more 
people than ever in the history of the Anthropocene were spending their days in the online space 
(because of Covid-19 work from home); although it was not my intention to investigate digital 
privacy during a moment where the President of the United States, himself, commits COINTEL-
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PRO like actions from his office by posting pictures of protestors on his official twitter account; 
this is the current reality. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
Method/Design 
 This research explores the perceptions of justice in the online environment by people of 
color and examines how those perceptions influence the use of specific digital privacy behaviors: 
privacy setting, contact management, access setting, and identity masking (Chen, Beaudoin, 
Hong 2016, 418). To understand how participants perceive justice and determine their use of 
digital privacy behaviors, the study employs three anthropological methods: semi-structured in-
terviews, a “profile-eliciation” exercise (Mannik and McGarry 2017, 179-195), and auto-ethnog-
raphy (160-178). The semi-structured interview includes eleven questions. The first question was 
consent to record, and the latter ten questions were open-ended questions asking about privacy 
and their online behavior (see Appendix A).  The “profile elicitation” involved showing four faux 
social media profiles to the participants and asking them to note any differences they notice in 
relation to the data displayed or privacy features they think are enabled. Lastly, the auto-ethnog-
raphy involved asking the participant to write a short-essay about themselves from the third-per-
son perspective. I also talked to people who were not formal participants in the study.  
Participants/Procedure 
 The researcher sent a university-wide email to all undergraduate and graduate students to 
inform potential participants of the research study. In addition, study information was dissemi-
nated on the researcher’s personal and professional social media profiles. The email included the 
research information and contact for the primary researchers. Current and former students who 
were interested in participating would email the primary researchers and in return would be sent 
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a detailed study flyer and informed consent agreement. The study flyer and the informed consent 
communicated the breadth of the study and students’ rights during the process. The study was 
approved by Illinois State University’s Institutional Review Board. This study was qualitative 
and therefore allowed for more full responses from participants. Because of the variance in ques-
tioning, including self-questioning, the design allows for the researchers to understand and cross-
check the responses of the participants. Of the seventeen formal participants in the study, half I 
recruited from my personal and professional social media networks. Four knew me in my day-to-
day life. 
Measures/Analysis 
 The semi-structured interview was broken into three parts. The first allowed the partici-
pants to provide demographic information, their own perceptions of urban minority, and to con-
ceptualize privacy on the spot. The next section asked them specifically about the digital privacy 
strategies that they have employed. The last section asked them a range of questions about social 
media profiles and privacy. A coding scheme was developed and applied based on the theory of 
digital privacy strategies to look for specific terms that signal behaviors. This data was analysed 
with a more open ended approach, and provides context to the coding method applied in the 
semi-structure interview. For the auto-ethnography, the participants essays are coded using be-
haviors they have expressed in the semi-structured interview as unsafe. In addition to the con-
trolled research, participative observation as part of the researchers everyday life in the digital 
environment. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE WHITE SPACE 
Tyga & Crocheting While Black 
 Tyga is a millennial woman of color from the south side of the city of Chicago. She is 
mixed-race Black and white, but she identifies as Black and is a member of the Black communi-
ty. She recently obtained her bachelor’s degree. Tyga is an avid crocheter who thinks of crochet 
as a therapeutic practice. She went online to find the broader crochet community with whom to 
share experiences and ideas. When we discussed her personal feelings of safety in the online 
space, she spoke of experiences that are constant reminders of the presence of her oppressors. 
When asked, how safe she feels in the online environment, Tyga responded: 
On a scale from one to ten, I probably feel like a four or five…I just know that as 
a Black person that we are heavily surveilled, and I’m like very much a part of the 
fiber community, crochet community, and seeing how Black people posting in an 
outfit that they’ve created will get censored and blocked. And someone from a 
different race, or someone who identifies as white or perceived as white, they 
weren’t getting the same kind of surveillance. So, I feel that I have to be careful of 
the content that I post, my political messages and censoring myself because I 
don’t want to garner attention. 
 Tyga continued by mentioning a big name in the fiber community, a woman of color, who 
was censored for wearing crochet shorts while white women wearing similar garments were not. 
It was censored. The picture was taken down from her profile, and the tags that 
she had associated with the top were all blocked…Even all the pictures that 
weren’t hers, where people used the tag, they were removed too. 
 Tyga made sure that she was careful about what she posts online in fiber communities 
after witnessing this situation unfold. Later in the conversation, Tyga clarified that she was even 
wary of posting pictures of patterns that used designs that could be perceived as ethnic or ex-
pressing ethnic pride because she fears persecution. 
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 When asked if Tyga thought it was the platform’s internal review processes or other users 
individual reporting that resulted in the censoring of Black crocheters’ images, she explained 
that, to her knowledge, the fiber community was divided, and a culture of reporting Black con-
tent had arisen. She cites the election of President Donald Trump as a huge impetus for this rift. 
They are calling out a lot of racism that exists within the fiber community. So 
with that, there’s been this huge backlash. And a lot of prominent knitters, primar-
ily white knitters who do not want to get with the program, they started making 
their profiles private. They started creating a colorway [specific dye patterns] that 
makes fun of the Black Lives Matter movement and people of color. And they 
will report Black content. 
 Tyga mostly spoke in our interviews from her perspective as an instagram user, but she 
also talked about her negative experiences on the Facebook platform. She reported similar forms 
of harassment on that platform previous to deleting her account. She bemoaned the fact that peo-
ple were not interested in forming a community; instead, they used the reporting process as a 
means of suppressing the voices of people of color. Unfortunately, because of the biased review 
process, the racists, misogynists, and trolls continually won. So, Tyga eventually deleted her ac-
count. 
 Tyga deals with the online dangers that are tied to her Blackness and womanhood by 
posting selectively [access setting], making her profiles private [contact management], and even-
tually self-deplatforming [privacy setting]. While she identifies a culture of hatred as the imme-
diate threat, she also reports her fear of the uneven procedural justice for people of color in the 
online space. The reporting process, which is a foundational system of justice in the online space, 
was being used by the oppressors to perpetrate attacks against crocheters of color. It is clear that 
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she believes that creators of color’s innocuous content would not be taken down if the reporting 
process were fair and consistent. 
Noshi & the Midnight Massacre 
 Noshi is a Black queer trans person, an older millennial, and an experienced user in the 
online space. During our conversations, they spoke extensively of the censoring of Black and 
queer persons and their content in the online space. They became particularly impassioned when 
talking about the mass exodus of Tumblr which began in 2013. Tumblr was the refuge of 
weirdos, sex positive persons, queer persons, anime obsessors — people simply looking for a 
safe space— for many years. After the purchase of the platform by Yahoo in 2013, the platform 
announced a radical change in its acceptable content policies. Yahoo sought to “clean up” the 
platform. At first, Tumblr users were reassured that the target of these new policies would be il-
legal and inappropriate content only. However, the words and actions of the platform were in-
congruent. Noshi explains: 
Yahoo was like, okay, we're going to start censoring what people can put on our 
site…The problem came, in the sense that what they decided to censor was too 
large of a scope. One of my favorite sayings is ‘we hunt with rifles, not grenades’. 
They hunted with grenades. They basically decided to just mass censor a lot of 
content on the site. There was a huge government push against sex work and 
pornography and things like that. So like, they became way too serious about cen-
sorship. They were very serious about censoring, ‘female presenting’ nipples. 
That was like the quote that stuck out to everyone. So like, once that hit, I left. I 
left that platform because they started restricting content. They started censoring 
people's content that wasn't even pornographic, wasn't even nude, wasn't even 
anything. Literally, [people] went to sleep, and they woke up the next morning. 
And legitimately, two thirds of their content had been restricted, had either been 
deleted, or restricted access to it, or just censored so that people would have to go 
through like a barrier to access it. And I was like, Oh, no, I'm good on that. And I 
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left that platform, and I haven't been back. So yeah, that's just one. That's one ex-
ample of it. 
 Noshi vividly recounts how the community was attacked by the platform. They were 
pinned into submission. The platform did not consult the community at all. Noshi’s reason for 
leaving the platform reveals their concern with procedural justice. When they felt it impossible to 
attain such justice, they practiced extreme privacy setting by self-deplatforming. They had 
deemed that there could be no safety found on the platform. As they stated, there was no trans-
parent review process; there was no appeal process; and the actions were done without notice. A 
majority of Tumblr users at the time, many of whom were queer person-of-color artists and mod-
els who created safe spaces on Tumblr, never had a chance to save their content or preserve their 
profiles. They, like Noshi, fled the platform. For those artists, leaving the platform potentially 
cost them a great deal: friends, exposure, collaborations, feedback on their work, a history of 
consistently being active and producing quality work. Many gave up much to self-deplatform. 
However, they felt that their safety in the online space was worth the cost of leaving the plat-
form. 
The White Space According to Anderson 
 Researchers continue to investigate how offline social organizing and practice affect peo-
ples’ use of the online space. The work of Fuchs and Horak (2008), Morales et al (2016), Kafer 
(2019), Kania-Lundholm (2019), Wajcman (2015) show that there is no longer a clear offline-
online space, and that minority status in the online environment is precarious. Fuchs and Horak 
conceptualize a digital apartheid by examining the digital divide on the African continent. Start-
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ing from their assertion of digital apartheid, I work backwards using Elijah Anderson’s White 
Space framework to understand the online space, digital divide, and minority participation in the 
U.S. context. Investigating the racial elements of digital inequality has mostly been taboo in the 
West. Digital inequality has mainly been framed as a socio-economic issue but not a racial one. 
The accepted research norm has long been that digital disparities may align with racial divisions, 
but the effect of race on digital inequality is overstated. The lauded Johannes van Djik, in part-
nership with Kenneth Hacker, (2003) wrote in a quantitative investigation of the digital divide 
that “talk about ‘technological segregation’ ([by] NAACP President Kweisi Mfume) and ‘classi-
cal apartheid’ ([by] Reverend Jesse Jackson) is exaggerated and misses the point” (324). Almost 
two decades later, the interest in digital inequality as it relates to race and ethnicity is rising, 
mainly spawned by global south theorists and activists, and the dismissal of Mfume and Jack-
son’s words appears misplaced and irresponsible. 
 Anderson (2015) defines white space — settings in which Black people are typically ab-
sent, not expected, or marginalized when present (10) — and identifies three factors that con-
tribute to the maintenance of a (physical) white space: policing, gentrification, and outright vio-
lence. I apply these criteria to explain that the online space is white space and that the conceptu-
alization of the digital divide as racial is sufficiently valid. Before we move into the theory and 
cases, I emphatically agree with Anderson’s conceptualization of white as white-passing and 
Black as not white-passing. 
 Anderson argued that white people create spaces where they feel comfortable foremost 
via policing. In the case of outdoor space, this is mostly literal physical mechanisms to remove 
Black persons and put them in their rightful place, akin to slave catching. There are countless 
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cases of Black persons being surveilled by white people and having the policed called on them 
(McNamarah 2019). One such case was that of 43 year-old Travis Miller Senior. Travis works as 
a furniture delivery driver in the Oklahoma City area. After he delivered furniture to a home in a 
gated community, Travis was followed by a white man who suspected him of being a burglar. 
The white man then blocked the road with his car to disallow Travis and his coworker from leav-
ing the gated community grounds (Padilla 2020). As Travis tried to reason with the initial white 
man, the white man called a friend to come and support his attempts to block Travis’ truck from 
leaving. The entire incident was recorded and streamed on Facebook Live. The initial white man 
who followed and blocked in Travis justified his actions by saying “I own one-eighteenth of 
what you’re sitting on. This street is private. This is not city property. This street is maintained by 
the people that live in here.” (para. 13) The situation was resolved by the resident who order the 
furniture. And the police, who had been called, were told to stand down. By the end, Travis could 
be seen breaking down with tears streaming down his face. Similar actions against people of col-
or are perpetrated across the country and reify physical space as white space. The white men 
were eager to catch a Black man “out of place” so that he may be returned to where he is al-
lowed. While the argument that Travis was a burglar seems plausible at first utterance, is it? 
Travis is a burglar who knew where the gated community was, gained access to the community, 
procured a fake uniform, called a fake supervisor, engaged peacefully with people who ques-
tioned him about his appropriateness in “their” space, and never tried to run away when con-
fronted, and was leaving the premises with an empty truck? 
 Common forms of physical policing are: the police, redlining, sundowning, dress poli-
cies, hair-style prohibitions, but, if a Black person is physically allowed into a space, policing 
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transforms into social policing. Anderson identifies the “ ‘dance,’ through which individual 
blacks are required to show that the ghetto stereotypes do not apply to them” (13), as the expec-
tation lest eviction from white space occur, immediately or “in due time” — the dance is also 
referred to as “walking the tightrope”. White people conceive of the ghetto as a place of “danger, 
crime, and poverty”, and actions associated, accurately or inaccurately, with the ghetto trigger a 
danger response from white people. Common forms of social policing are: using offensive terms 
to refer to Black people, correcting Black speech, ascribing culpability because of common eth-
nic outward appearance, prohibition of open-air playing of rap music at residences, in parks, and 
at events. And, just like in the old days of slave catching, there are consequences for infractions. 
However, in most cases, the pressure of the white space, which taps into white privilege and 
power, is implicit, so Black people comply. This results in the yielding of space, and Black space 
is born again as white. 
 Secondly, Anderson identifies the inverse action born of white surveillance powers: gen-
trification. This can also be expressed as a type of appropriation of cultured space. If white peo-
ple are not scared by the ghetto, they are drawn to it. They invade neighborhoods and transform 
them through concerted capitalistic actions different from those normally found in working-class 
Black spaces. This is to be differentiated from white persons simply moving to and participating 
in Black communities. Usually, those looking to gentrify are looking for specific cultural aspects 
that are readily commodifiable, and they know that through targeted investments they can refine 
aspects of the neighborhoods deemed acceptable. They eradicate the rest, including people. 
Black people living within gentrifying neighborhoods are simply along for the ride, captured in 
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the financial aims of white outsiders and those who are doing the “dance” at the most proficient 
level. 
 The last method highlighted by Anderson is outright violence. Anderson borrows the ex-
periences of a law student in Washington D.C. to demonstrate how violence creates white space. 
Shawn was brutalized by police as he waited for the bus to go home after grocery shopping. He 
had been doing nothing wrong. He had been waiting with other people. And he was complying 
— even to the extent that he dropped his phone and groceries. However, he was still brutalized 
by police. This despite the pleading of those around him. Even if they wanted him to feel safe 
and included in the space, they had no power to change the reality that the act of brutalizing 
would have: creating white space. Shawn’s case is especially disappointing because it demon-
strated how all three processes of white space work together. The white people in his neighbor-
hood had surveilled him, deemed him suspicious, and reported his description to the police for a 
robbery. While the actions of the neighbors was wrong enough, it was the violence against 
Shawn’s Black body which was witnessed by white people in the neighborhood which created 
the white space. Those who disagreed with the actions of the police were powerless to stop its 
effects, and those who thought the violence justified felt vindicated. Shawn’s experiences mirror 
my own of being arrested, roughed up, and detained by Madison, Wisconsin police as a seven-
year-old. 
 The vignette of police brutalizing Shawn, a law student in Washington D.C., serves as a 
reminder of the most often used method to achieve white space: violence. The Colfax, Louisiana 
Massacre 1873; Wilmington, North Carolina Massacre 1898; Wounded Knee Massacre 1890; 
Atlanta, Georgia Massacre, 1906; East St. Louis, Missouri Massacre 1917; Elaine, Arkansas 
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Massacre 1919; Tulsa, Oklahoma Massacre 1921; Rosewood, Florida Massacre 1923; Catcher, 
Arkansas Massacre 1923; Ponce, Puerto Rico Massacre 1937; Chicago Memorial Day Massacre 
1937; Orangeburg, South Carolina Massacre 1968; Greensboro, North Carolina Massacre 1979; 
Oak Creek, Wisconsin Massacre 2012; and the Charleston, North Carolina Massacre 2015 are 
also testament to the extent of violence that has been acceptable against Black persons for the 
creation or maintenance of white space. 
 Applying Anderson’s framework, we can assess the online space to identify instances 
which would reinforce it as divided on racial lines. First, let’s look for policing. Maarten Sap et 
al. (2019), Davidson, Bhattacharya, and Weber (2019), and Guynn (2020) demonstrate that Black 
people’s posts are flagged more often because their vernacular is deemed “offensive” by white 
users and AI. Those that are supposed to be helped by the system end up being policed by it. And 
users engage in the same policing behaviors as platforms to the detriment of Blacks in the online 
space — as my participants experiences will show. A 2015 Wired Special Issue article by Bijian 
Stephen shows how Black space even at the beginning of the Black Lives Matter movement was 
contested. The interviewed activists explain that they felt watched in the online space and ex-
pressed an effort to explore alternative to the major platforms. Years later, a Washington Post ar-
ticle by Antonia Noori Farzan exposed police infiltration of Black Lives Matter Groups (2018). 
No one knows the exact scope of these operations or how much control was and is asserted over 
the spaces that are thought to be safe for Black people (Loedenthal 2014). 
 Gentrification in the online environment is a regular occurrence across all social media 
platforms. It is most often criticized as simply appropriation, but this wording ignores the insidi-
ousness of the action. In the context of the cut-throat online environment, a white person appear-
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ing on instagram doing traditional Black hairstyles will inevitably destroy the existing or poten-
tial viewership base for Black persons. There is no dominant term for this action, but the term 
“blackfishing” has been used by some in the online space. The most egregious example of black-
fishing, which alludes to catfishing — defined by Oxford as luring someone into a relationship 
by means of a fictional online persona — is the Kardashian family. Besides the fact that most of 
the Kardashian women have drastically altered their appearances to look more Black, they have 
used blackfishing to authoritatively appropriate Black styling and hairstyling techniques. Most 
notoriously, Kendall Jenner was strongly criticized in 2018 for wearing cornrows and receiving 
credit from fashion magazines for the “new styles”. She also credited the style to Bo Derek and 
completely erases their African-American roots by referring to them as “Bo Derek Braids”. As 
many people of color on social media rightfully reminded fashion magazine photographers, 
columnists, and readers, the entire Kardashian family has become rich and famous by stealing 
from other cultures, and they rarely publicly address social justice. They wear cornrows for a 
fashion shoot to look edgy, but say nothing of the discrimination of Blacks for wearing the hair-
style. White people are assuming the bodies of Black people, literally replacing them in the on-
line space (Virk and McGregor 2018; Jackson 2018). 
 In another example, Rachel Dolezal masqueraded as a Black woman for much of her 
adult life, becoming a professor and activist by appropriating Black struggle. Even after being 
“outed” in 2017, she continues to insist that she is not white and that she identifies as Black (St. 
Felix 2018; Levine 2020). A similar situation unfolded in late 2020. George Washington Univer-
sity professor Jessica Krug “came out" as a white woman (Jackson 2020). She had already re-
ceived funding from organizations that were seeking to support Black women in academia (Fla-
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herty 2020). In a more insidious manner, these white women adopted Blackness and found suc-
cess. Criminal or not, their actions marginalized Black women. In the online space, it is even eas-
ier to assume darker skin and kinky hair because of social media filters that darken skin, add hair, 
and apply make-up; white people have been creative in the use of these technologies not merely 
for entertainment but for profit and power. 
 Lastly, violence directed towards Black people happens in the online space. If anyone has 
ever played an online game, they have experienced it. As soon as you connect to the matchmak-
ing lobby, someone screams “nigger”, “beaner” or “faggot”. The online gaming world is usually 
wild but sometimes it goes beyond being bombarded with slurs. Even without the clear intent of 
the speaker, it is undeniable that events like this hurt people of color and make them feel unwel-
come, whether they are prepared for it or not. In some cases, it’s not so immediate, and the vio-
lence occurs during moments of high pressure in the online environment, or sometimes for no 
reason at all (Sholars 2017). It is not uncommon for groups to form for the sole purpose of an-
tagonizing gamers of color. Some groups will only attack players who have Black in-game char-
acters, user avatars, or names that sound Black or ethnic (Castro 2019; Pettit 2020; Van DerWerff 
2014; Alford 2020; Miller 2018). 
 Outside of gaming, harassment is widespread on big social media platforms. In 2020, a 
Facebook Blackout day was organized to force Facebook to address harassment of Black people 
on the platform (Guynn 2020); it was moderately successful, but there was no major action by 
Facebook although there were perfunctory statements by the platform. 
 With Covid-19 restrictions and the rise of working/school from home emerged a wave of 
“Zoom-bombing” that were suspected and known to be racially driven (Bond 2020). These hack-
	 40
ers, or moderately savvy internet users, interrupted meetings held via the Zoom video conferenc-
ing software. They targeted events by Black people and showed hurtful images and screamed 
hate-speech — the bowels of the internet, 4chan, planned it openly (Bakht 2020). 
 Using Anderson’s framework for the white space, we can identify similar methods of 
policing, gentrifying, and violence against Black people in the online space. The online space is 
often thought of as a utopia, but the days of online anonymity are over and the risks are very real 
for people of color. The following personal experiences from this study’s participants carry the 
mark of the trifecta of white space genesis, but they most strongly speak about policing. 
 Many of this study’s participants entered into the online environment to derive some so-
cial benefit — to find community, to keep in touch with their family. However, after some time 
they realized that the online space would also deny them privacy. They would not find distribu-
tive or procedural justice on big social media. This denial of ownership and privacy emerges 
from the fact that the online space is purposefully white space, as explained in the literature re-
view, and encourages behavior by white people that maintains the space as white as posited by 
Anderson. 
Ery Explains Systemic White Space 
 Ery, a queer non-binary millennial of color, also expressed concern at the uneven pro-
cedural justice in the online space. Ery is all about justice in their daily life. Social, political, 
economic, environmental. They talk the talk, and they don’t endlessly equivocate like most peo-
ple; they live out their espoused beliefs on making the world a better place. During the course of 
the interview we talked about the dangers that both people and institutions pose to each others’ 
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privacy. In response to this, I asked Ery, “Do you think the bigger threat is the individuals or in-
stitutions?” 
I mean, knowing that individuals ultimately make up these institutions and are the 
ones that have to institute the checks and balances. I mean, even in the instances 
where people have been posting about racism or use particular words and know 
that if their content was flagged, it would just be removed. But in other instances 
where like hate language is being used, posted by someone who's probably like 
not a minority. Their posts aren't removed this quickly and just knowing that there 
is some sort of discernment about what gets taken down and when, until, like, the 
reaction to things that are considered hateful or negative? And who was making 
that call? As far as I know, it's not an algorithm. I feel like people actually have to 
look and read these things and make this decision. 
 Ery highlights that there are a different set of standard and rules when it comes to people 
of color in the online space. In this case, again, specifically when it comes to reporting and con-
tent screening. Ery talks about a long running practice of Facebook moderators to flag posts by 
persons of color that use offensive language for the purposes of advocacy, education, and em-
powerment. These posts are usually taken down very quickly. Conversely, posts by non-persons 
of color, which feature the same words, are not flagged and taken down. In many instances, these 
posts are not even removed after being reported by users. Ery elaborates that it goes beyond the 
people who are making the decisions at institutions such as Facebook. 
I wouldn't say that any institution or process is immune from systemic racism and 
like, the standard of white supremacy in this country, like, we make these tools 
that we use and we are inherently having those biases and haven’t challenged 
them well enough for me to be confident that these policing measures [by plat-
forms] are applied equitable. 
 Ery’s worries about their ability to receive or wrestle procedural justice from the claws of 
major institutions leads them to post very selectively in the online space [access setting]. Al-
though they have not left any platform, they have chosen to focus on consumption of content 
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they have curated themselves instead of posting. While Ery does not self-deplatform, they do 
employ a form of extreme privacy setting which they believe provides the maximum safety in 
the online space. 
Anha, the New Challenger 
 Anha is younger than what is generally considered millennial; she is most likely a mem-
ber of Generation Z. She is biracial Japanese and White. While she does not readily deem herself 
a person of color, she does identify with being a minority. She spends a lot of her time on the in-
ternet going between the major platforms and social media phone apps, such as Tik Tok. Anha 
explains, almost impartially, that she encounters offensive content in the online space and tries to 
report it as much as she can. And although she has had some minor success — she has gotten 
posts removed on twitter, she says that the majority of the time nothing happens. The platforms 
investigate the posts she reports, but there is no action. The inaction by platforms confuses her 
because, according to her, the content she reports is clearly against the rules of the platform. I 
asked Anha if she felt empowered in the online space and she said that outside of the few suc-
cesses she has had in reporting content, she does not feel empowered as a user to create positive 
change on the platforms she uses via the reporting function. 
The Author's Personal Experiences 
 These experiences above mirrored my own experience of reporting someone during the 
2020 George Floyd and Breonna Taylor protests. An acquittance of mine, who I met through a 
group for people preparing to teach English in Japan and those returning from teaching in Japan, 
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started to post racially inflammatory content on Instagram. He was angered by the Instagram 
Blackout campaign — a campaign where allies to the Black Lives Matter cause changed their 
profile pictures to an all Black photo and posted a Black square to their profile with the aim of 
highlight ing Black voices. After a few days, he deleted all of his Instagram photos: pictures of 
his family, his work, and his travels around the world. Most notably, he deleted pictures of his 
performances; he was a musician. Soon after his profile went blank, he started to post videos of 
himself at a shooting range firing large weapons. The tags on these posts usually read something 
like “They are not going to catch me off guard” or “I’m making sure I’m ready”. Previous to this 
behavior, this acquaintance had gotten into arguments with friends of mine in the comments of 
my Facebook posts. He challenged that racial discrimination was still an issue in modern society. 
He didn’t understand why people were talking about slavery when it happened so long ago, and 
there was no one alive who has been a perpetrator or a victim. I had blocked him, but because of 
the Facebook friend import system between Facebook and Instagram, he was still my friend on 
Instagram. He previously refused to engage in respectful dialogue but felt entitled to be heard, he 
never seemed violent. But after seeing the videos, I became worried, so I decided to report the 
videos. One month later, Instagram messaged me that the investigations into his posts had been 
closed and that no further action would be taken; there was nothing wrong with his posts. Even 
considering the second amendment and his right to post on social media, the inquiry and “action” 
by Instagram took weeks. However, posts about police brutality against Black persons by myself 
and friends are reported and removed in a matter of hours.  Our posts were taken down promptly, 
but the review of my former acquaintances’ inflammatory and violence-inducing posts took over 
a month. 
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Hione Stands Her Ground 
 Hione falls at the tail end of Generation X. She is an intrepid immigrant from Japan who 
fell in love with her military sweetheart and immigrated to the U.S. She has lived here for 20 
years. She is calm yet gutsy. She is always rooting for and fighting for the underdog. She is a 
teacher that is especially passionate about teaching students with special needs. She loves dogs, 
and she and her family have rescued many — even right off the street. She has seen hardship and 
struggle, but she always tries to see the bright side. Many of her posts in the online space are 
about bringing joy — even during this particularly nasty time. However, that does not mean she 
shies away from discussions she feels are important. 
 Hione is not primarily worried about digital privacy outside of her financial safety. She 
has some concerns about platforms’ widespread collection of data and the potential buyers of that 
data; however, she is not overly concerned because she is, like many other people of color partic-
ipating in the study, purposeful with what she shares in the online space. This is mostly success-
ful at protecting Hione, but she shared two instances where her presence and participation in the 
online space was challenged by white men. 
 In one instance, Hione was engaging in open discussion in the comments section of a ma-
jor platform. A white men then perused her profile and openly questioned her citizenship. Hione 
believes that he saw that her birthplace and hometown were in Japan. She explains that the only 
reason she has these set on Facebook is to be easily found by people that she grew up with in 
Japan. The discussion was about Japan - U.S. relations, and Hione believes that the man who 
challenged her citizenship did so purposefully to silence her. She did not back down. 
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 In a second instance, another white man tried to silence Hione because of his suspicion 
about her national origin and current status. As Hione points out, these actions are purposeful in 
their use to create white space. The posts on which Hione commented were public and open to 
all seeking to join discussion. However, the white men felt that an Asian person had no rightful 
place in the discussion. They assume that being Asian means that she is other. They assume she 
is not here legally. They assume that being Asian means she uninformed. They assume she lacks 
the patriotic spirit they associate distinctly with whiteness and maleness. They attacked Hione to 
drive her away and create white space; if they had their way, she would get no seat at the table. 
Justice in the White Space  
 The experiences provide a personal perspective of how white space is created and reified 
both structurally and socially. Older people of color participants have a keen sense that they are 
being watched, and that distributive nor procedural justice is equally applied to them. Tyga and 
Noshi strongly allude to widespread gentrification in the online space, and how Black culture 
and creation is becoming ubiquitous and profitable. If people of color (called Black in Ander-
son’s framework) creators and artists are purposefully targeted by platforms, the spaces they pre-
viously occupied will be yielded to white persons. This includes the potential economic benefits 
to be gained by participating in those spaces. This includes the potential say in how the online 
space evolves going forward. In cases where white people cannot easily police and coop spaces, 
they will practice violence, such as the coordinated reporting practices explained by Tyga and the 
attacks on Hione. The experiences of my participants give validity to the thought that the online 
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space is white space. The legacy of the online environment remains unchanged, and that legacy 
impacts people of color’s safety. 
 The exception within the experiences above is Anha. She is not an older millennial; she is 
not a millennial at all. However, she expresses an obligation to use her power on the platforms 
she visits daily. She has some sense of procedural justice. Interestingly, Anha’s understanding of 
her rights and role in the online environment come partly from from her education. As part of the 
interview, she talked about courses she took in high school which helped her see the digital envi-
ronment more clearly and prepared her for staking out a safe space. This is potentially the key to 
surviving and possibly altering the continually oppressive legacy of the online space. It might be 
the way to disrupt white space for both white and Black users and bridge the divide. 
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CHAPTER V: INTERGENERATIONAL BLACK TRAUMA 
Noshi & The Black Household Noshi 
 Noshi spends countless hours on instagram and twitter. They are constantly liking and 
posting about beautiful big Black women, chatting with trusted friends, and video chatting while 
watching movies and TV shows. They are an avid cuber, a person who solves Rubik’s cubes, and 
an unabashed connoisseur of cannabis. They stream videos of themself cubing while “having a 
trip” multiple times a week. Observing Noshi in the online space, one would not think that they 
worried much about privacy, but our discussions and time together in the online space revealed a 
deep concern about privacy. 
 Noshi was an eager participant in the study. At the time, they were dealing with suppres-
sion of their posts on instagram — their posts were being reported constantly and swiftly re-
moved. I believe this study provided them an outlet for their frustration at what they felt was un-
fair treatment. After the initial interview, Noshi and I engaged in many discussions about digital 
privacy and existing in the online space as a person of color. The following paragraphs draw 
from both the formal interview and many subsequent conversations. 
 Noshi grew up in a middle class Black household on the far south side of Chicago. When 
describing their upbringing, they admit they grew up in a home where technology was ubiqui-
tous. By their teen years, they were already becoming concerned and testing the limits of security 
in the online environment. Noshi specifically cites their ability to conduct penetration testing, 
which is a fairly involved process that reveals the vulnerabilities of the internet configuration of 
other online users. While they believe their early exposure to these techniques and technologies 
influence their current perception and practice of digital privacy, they reveal that their upbringing 
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in a Black household, specifically, has done much to shape their perception and practice. Noshi 
first alludes to the influence of the Black household on their privacy when talking about the sense 
of freedom and ownership in the Black household. 
 Noshi: “So yeah, I feel like the internet is kind of always been through and 
through [a constant in] my life. I’ve never felt like it was restricted to me at all or 
that my privacy was a thing. My privacy existed, like I used to have a journal 
when I was a kid that I used to write in, like a physical piece of paper journal. And 
to me, that was like the only private thing that I had. I very quickly realized that it 
wasn’t private because I shared a room with a sibling, and that I had parents. And 
if you know anything about our households, you know, there's no such thing as a 
locked door in our household.” 
 Denavious: “[For those who don’t know,] What do you mean by our households?” 
 Noshi: “A Black household? A Black household does not have locked doors!…In 
a Black household, there’s no such thing as a locked door. You don’t own your 
room. You don’t have a room. Like, ‘Get out of my room!’, that doesn’t exist in 
Black households. There’s no ‘Don’t touch my things!’. You don’t own anything 
in a Black household because you didn’t pay for none of it. And your parents, at 
least my parents, were very eager and very willing to inform me and demonstrate 
to me how much I didn’t own anything. So, privacy is never a thing in a Black 
household. You grow up in a Black household, you’re lucky if you have a parent 
that understands and respects your privacy or the idea of privacy.” 
 For Noshi, personal privacy is founded on notions of personal freedom and personal 
ownership. Black participants in this study reveal that intergenerational trauma is integral to their 
formations of privacy and association of justice with privacy; Additionally, it seems that inter-
generational trauma guides them to initially preface ownership and, therefore, distributive justice 
when constructing and asserting privacy in the online environment. After realizing the complexi-
ty and impossibility of maintaining privacy on the basis of distributive justice, some Black par-
ticipants seek procedural justice. However, uneven systemic forces in the online space, which 
fall on the seemingly indissoluble racial divide, quagmire their efforts. Some participants resort 
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to privacy setting, one of four main digital privacy strategies, to an extreme extent; they self-de-
platform. 
 The vector of privacy, justice, and employed digital privacy strategy is based on a linguis-
tic ideology founded on the construction of a Black household by participants. Black participants 
in this study either talk directly about or allude to a uniquely Black upbringing. To directly refer-
ence this uniquely Black upbringing, they use “Black household”, “our household”, “Black par-
ents”. However, they reference this upbringing in more nuanced ways in the way in which they 
talk about their upbringings. Notably, when asked about digital privacy, or disprivacy — a term 
that I use to signify the absence of privacy — many participants reflect on their upbringings and 
treatment by their parents. It seems that for Black participants, the Black household is deeply 
important for how they understand privacy and justice and how they employ digital privacy 
strategies. 
 The Black household and intergenerational Black trauma as influencers of digital behav-
ior logically flows from initial theorizing on the digital divide and behavior in the digital space. 
The most well known theorist of the modern internet’s effect on and magnification of offline cul-
ture, Manuel Castells, posited that the existing ills of society would persist in the digital realm. 
However, in this study, and specifically in this section, I examine the personal understandings 
and personal lineages of the obfuscating, aloof phrasing of intergenerational Black trauma as 
some permutation of socio-political-economic-status. By adopting the perspective of my partici-
pants, who express the importance of intergenerational Black trauma for formations of privacy, I 
reframe the discourse such that one must always consider who or what is the oppressor in the 
online space — those who are the oppressors in the offline space; even the father of the Internet, 
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J. C. R. Licklider, expressly outlines a usage case for adaptive-learning computer technologies 
for discriminating and gatekeeping undesirable people, “Your computer will know who is presti-
gious in your eyes and buffer you from a demanding world” (1968, 39). Intergeneration Black 
trauma provides a framework which involves the ancestors, both far and near, and the present as 
it affects the privacy strategies of this study’s Black participants in the online space. 
 This idea of an inherited behavioral legacy in the Black community is encapsulated as 
Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome by Joy DeGruy (2005), but here I have decided to use the com-
bination of the terms which she uses to explain the “syndrome”. That is because my focus is not 
on pathologizing but explaining human experience. DeGruy theorizes “transgenerational adapta-
tions associated with the past traumas of slavery and on-going oppression” (135) that result in 
self-hatred, disdain, and even outright violence between Black people in post-colonial environ-
ments. The hypothesis is based on DeGruy’s experiences traveling through Africa in the late 
1990s observing people and their communities — both colonized and uncolonized — and her 
experiences living in America as an African American woman and mother. To endure hundreds 
of years of cruelly successful domination of Black bodies, to endure constant psychological war-
fare against Black minds, DeGruy posits that Black persons adopted certain behaviors and beliefs 
that are laced with the trauma of our ancestors’ experiences (101-104). 
 Of behavior, DeGruy provides the practice of self-denigration. Blacks almost reflexively 
denigrate their own community, and their family members are not exempt from this practice. 
Conversely, DeGruy examples this behavior by providing an anecdote of parents speaking about 
their children after receiving a compliment about their child’s success from another parent. The 
white parent unabashedly speaks supportively and proudly of their child. The Black parent 
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quizzically speaks badly of their child. I have also observed this behavior. Most of the people in 
the conversation perceive it as politeness, but DeGruy rightfully questions why the behavior, and 
often the expectation, is one-sided. Also, what of the child who may be subjected to these re-
marks. Does the child recognize or acknowledge these comments as tokens in a game of social 
bartering? Neither DeGruy nor I believe so. 
 Of belief, DeGruy highlights the what results in child disempowerment. She calls this 
vacant esteem. Black children do not believe that they can achieve their dreams; they do not be-
lieve they can be or do whatever they aspire. The result is an insidious jealousy of the success of 
other Blacks. Although I did not grow up in a household where this was a mantra, Many of my 
peers did, and I witnessed and, participated in countless discussions involving older Black men 
admonishing youth against being an “uppity nigger”. This passes the torch of trauma from gener-
ation to generation. worthlessness for Black children. Noticeably, DeGruy does not identify reli-
gion as a belief or contributor to beliefs that perpetuate trauma. Religion as a vehicle for trauma 
has been posited by authors such as Sikivu Hutchinson (2011, 2013), Anthony Pinn (2017), and 
Cristopher Cameron (2019). 
 Intergenerational Black trauma is very real. It is constantly reference in common terms by 
members of the Black community. In most cases, Black people talk about it comically. Many 
Black-centered sitcoms have also taken this approach. Shows like Everybody Hates Chris and 
Black-ish try to balance the good and the bad of these intergeneration adaptations; Usually, the 
good and bad are wrapped in a single scene or joke. However, intergenerational Black trauma is 
a serious influencer of formations of privacy, justice, and freedom in the Black Household. This 
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theory of generationally inherited behaviors and beliefs is integral for understanding the experi-
ences and perspectives of some of the Black participants in this study. 
 The specific connection of personal privacy, personal freedom, and personal ownership is 
passed down generationally from parent to child. This connection manifests as a form of trauma 
— Noshi does not describe the experiences which taught them privacy as pleasant. However, 
what Noshi describes is not unique. It fits within the larger array of trauma thought to be passed 
down from slaves to their descendants that DeGruy and others (Harrisson-Ross 1973; Staples 
1993; Boyd-Franklin 1996; Bradley 1996; Raymond et al. 1998) argue argue are both internally 
reified through childrearing customers and externally reified through modern forms of enslave-
ment and discrimination. The association of privacy, freedom, and ownership are no coincidence 
in the American context. The inability of slaves to legally own their own bodies and assert own-
ership of their own bodies justified all necessary methods of policing  and surveillance (Finkel-
man 2012), even building slave quarters within view of the master’s house (Joyner 2003; Prunty 
1955; Orser and Nekola 1985; Barrow 1881). Because slaves were the legal property of others 
and denied autonomy, any imagined entitlement to privacy by them conflicted with the master’s 
primary legal obligation to secure and maintain their “goods” (Wahl 1997); they were not al-
lowed agency. Despite the trauma associated with privacy, freedom, and ownership norm acqui-
sition in their upbringing, Noshi perceives of ownership as positive; ownership is a domain 
through which privacy is extended, and conversely, privacy is a field that protects ownership. For 
example, Noshi owning his childhood journal may have created an expectation of privacy, yet 
without the sense that the journal is unviewable or unusable by others, the sense of ownership 
disappears. 
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Tean & The Black Religious Household 
 Tean is a biracial Black woman. She spent many of her formative years living in the sub-
urbs of Chicago and in Southern California. From an early age, she found an outlet in the online 
space. It offered her access to Japanese music, gothic culture, and a community of people like 
herself; those who were interested in society at the margins. She grew up as an only child to a 
devoutly Christian single mother, and the online space gave her independence. Like Noshi, she 
grew up under the philosophy that ownership, freedom, and privacy were connected; And she 
didn’t have any. Tean’s offline world was the Black religious household. 
 I would like to include religion as one of or contributing to the beliefs that perpetuates 
trauma because this is what is expressed by some of my participants. Tean was taught to be “qui-
et, be seen and not heard. Don’t speak unless you’re spoken to”. She ruminates that contemptu-
ousness in the Black household is connected to generational trauma from slavery.  
 The more I watched slavery movies as a child, the more I associated it with slav-
ery. I wondered if the way that the slave masters treated their slaves didn’t get 
passed down into Black culture, to where you still talk down to your own chil-
dren, your own family. You know, ‘Don't walk away when I’m speaking to you!’ 
 Although Tean does not explicitly mention privacy, in this case, the parent robs the child 
of privacy by eliminating their access to any space they may perceive as a safe haven for cher-
ished things and emotions. And more disturbingly, the adult invades the boundaries of emotional 
expressivity. The personal, the body loses its privacy, and the parent assumes ownership and 
therefore control of the child. 
 DeGruy recounts witnessing a similar experience. A Black mother and her children are 
waiting in line in a bank. There is also a White woman and her children waiting in line. DeGruy 
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notices that the Black mother will not allow her children to explore or act on their own curiosity, 
in stark contrasts to the white mother. In addition, DeGruy notices that when the Black mother’s 
daughter tries to create privacy, by hiding below the lip of the counter at which her mother talks 
to the clerk, another Black woman disallows reprieve (6-7). 
 When it comes to the concept of the Black household and privacy based on ownership, 
Tean similarly feels similarly to Noshi. In her house, she barely had the opportunity to close her 
room door, let alone lock it. She connects the lack of privacy to a prominence of misogyny in the 
Black religious community. The patriarchal hierarchy means that all members of the community 
outside of the male figureheads have little claim to ownership, freedom, or privacy. In a home 
with a single mother — who unbridledly denied Tean privacy — any hope of escaping disprivacy 
was placed in the heavenly patriarch. Unfortunately, the Christian god could not empathetically 
negotiate for privacy on Tean’s behalf despite it being much needed. Instead, god and the Bible 
were used to justify Tean’s oppression: “We are all God’s children!” In some cases Tean’s mother 
invaded her privacy for the specific purpose of praying over her “to shield her from the devil”. 
Tean spoke frequently of her fears of being intruded upon by her mother; she would come into 
her room unannounced to check on her, tell her about the lord. The anxiety from these experi-
ences is with Tean presently. 
Seva at the Intersection of Analog and Digital 
 Seva no longer spends much of her time in the online space. She occasionally posts on 
instagram — pictures of her smiling and just enjoying life. But other than these brief moments 
online, she doesn’t spend hours on the platform chatting, watching lives streams, or commenting 
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on posts. However, Seva found an escape in the digital world as a teenager. It was her window 
out of a Black household, like Tean’s, led by a single mother. 
 My mom was very invasive through my growing up and would always look at my 
texts, look at my Facebook, go through my messages. It caused a lot of issues that 
I feel just never needed to arise. 
 Seva does not reveal what her mother looked for when she perused her phone and social 
media — Black parents are not usually transparent in their intentions, most likely an inherited 
behavior. However, she does reveal what she worried that she would find. Seva was gay, and she 
had not revealed this to her parents. Her mom might find something that would out her. Further-
more, she was hiding a growing interest in goth fashion — a huge no-no in christian Black fami-
lies. 
 For Seva ownership, freedom, and privacy were complicated by the fact that she was en-
trusted with a cellphone that only she used. She was entrusted with a cellphone that had access to 
realms, social media, that were not reachable simply by unlocking the device. Her mother did not 
know her Facebook password. This differs from the situations of both Noshi and Tean. Having 
access to the online environment emboldened Seva; it allowed her to pick and choose her battles. 
 I wouldn’t want my mom to see me in my goth attire, but I posted anyways. I 
know she’s going to comment on it anyways. That is something where like, I want 
her to have to see that. I could just keep the photos to myself, but I don’t feel like 
letting her have that much power over what I want to post. 
Trauma & Privacy 
 These participants, who are Black, Brown, and Queer, allude to a pervasive intergenera-
tional Black Trauma that shapes privacy. They speak of this intergenerational trauma in terms of 
the Black household, which they perceive to be distinctly different than other households. This 
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distinct difference can be both positive and negative — these participants do not deny that their 
very particular upbringings probably shielded them from violence, drugs, and what many call 
“white people shit”. However, when these participants speak of privacy, they speak with palpable 
bitterness. That bitterness is directed towards their “homes”, their “parents”. For them, it's hard 
to imagine that, in their safest space and with the people who are supposed to nurture and guide 
them, care and love were expressed through control. However, most of all, they feel there was no 
sense of justice. 
 Most Black children have a moment when they pose the question, “Why you do me like 
that?” And most often, they are met with some variant of, “because, out there, that’s how they 
going to treat you!” Many Black parents have taken their own experiences, and those of their el-
ders, directly into the home. Many Black adults are made to know “their place” by their white 
counterparts (). In order to survive in a world where excellence and crudeness are both equally 
punished, many Blacks must learn to “dance” — an invaluable form of deceit that is one of few 
ways to survive in a world dominated by whiteness. Parents appear to bring the trauma of “walk-
ing the tightrope” to their parenting. They are always on-guard. And they exercise maximum 
control over their children, leaving little room for privacy. While their intentions may be good, 
and some would argue are justified, the children are then traumatized by experiences they have 
never had and quite possibly will never have. 
 Black participants in this study had a strong association between privacy and justice. I 
posit that privacy becomes synonymous with justice for these participants. Whether it be by 
agreement or by a purchasing act, the participants in this section could not secure privacy in 
childhood, in the Black household. 
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 For these participants explicitly, and for others who only alluded to the Black household, 
the past trauma endured by their ancestors and the trauma endured by their parents shapes their 
perceptions of privacy. Instead of privacy being negotiated based on trust and respect or even the 
necessity of understanding how people negotiate privacy, Black children in the Black household 
are seemingly taught privacy by the absence of it. They learn that privacy and ownership, specif-
ically accomplished through a purchasing act, are extricably connected. Trust or respect which 
are usually traded for or factor into the negotiations for privacy are diminished. 
 The disconnect is shown in the case of Seva. She is entrusted with a cellphone, but priva-
cy does not follow. This leads many Black persons to perceive justice or injustice in relation to 
privacy through the lens of the distribution of benefit [distributive justice]. Even personal agency 
born from the body [procedural justice] is detached from privacy, and that legacy seems to ex-
tend from slave livelihood. Although some critique the determinism and empiricism of theories 
like DeGruy’s, it is hard to assert that slavery has not had and still does not affect Black life in a 
major way. 
 A famous retort used by Black parents during intense situations with their children is “I 
brought you into this world, I’ll take you out of it!”. It encapsulates how children in some Black 
children encounter antiquated ideas about ownership in the Black household. Under these no-
tions of ownership, Black children do not have their own will, desires, or entitlements. I consult-
ed with non-Black friends to ask about this phrase. Some had heard it used by their parents, but 
they perceived it as more of an idiomatic threat. However, Black friends perceived that there was 
some deeper meaning. When one's parent speaks these words, they subvert all other ideas of ex-
	 58
istence. The child listening is not the child of a nation, not the child of society, not the child of 
god, but the sole possession of the parent. 
 Patricia Hill Collins challenges what she calls the “property model” of childrearing in 
Black Feminist Thought (2000) by arguing that communal responsibility for children subverts 
“capitalist property relations”: 
 African-American women who continue community-based child care challenge 
one fundamental assumption underlying the capitalist system itself: that children 
are “private property” and can be disposed of as such. Under the property model 
that accompanies the traditional family ideal, parents may not literally assert that 
their children are pieces of property, but their parenting may reflect assumptions 
analogous to those they make in connection with property. For example, the ex-
clusive parental “right” to discipline children as parents see fit, even if discipline 
borders on abuse, parallels the widespread assumption that property owners may 
dispose of their property without consulting members of the larger community. By 
seeing the larger community as responsible for children and by giving othermoth-
ers and other nonparents “rights” in child rearing, those African-Americans who 
endorse these values challenge prevailing capitalist property relations. (p. 182) 
 However, this holds true as long as there is a community for which Black children can 
participate. The 90s and naughts were tough times for Black neighborhoods. Many Black par-
ents, and in particular Black single mothers, kept their children inside for fear of their safety. 
This meant that opportunity for community parenting was rare, with the exception being the 
church. In addition, what Collins identifies as a shared “right” to punish is precisely the problem 
of intergenerational Black trauma. Why is punishment a shared commodity? If anything, the 
communal “right” to punish parallels the sentiment towards slaves. Anyone of the power group 
could capture, beat, and maim the slave for the purpose of reinforcing physical and mental reali-
ties of their enslavement. The slave remains the sole property of the owner. The child remains the 
property of the parent. 
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 For those raised in the Black household, their conceptions of privacy are shaped by their 
ancestors and parents’ trauma. The parents, themselves, are just as much victims as the children. 
They too are shaped by the vessel of enslavement, religious thought, and the precocity of Black 
life, their socio-economic status. Undeniably, there may be other factors that contribute to strict 
privacy measures in Black households, and affluent non-religious Black households can surely 
lack privacy; however according to this study’s Black participants, there is a distinctness to the 
Black household which informs their constructions of privacy and its relations to justice and in-
justice. The institution of the Black household, as identified by these participants, results in a 
very specific first-time internet user, one that is obsessed with ownership of online space. These 
users often enter into the online space looking to exercise personal ownership, personal freedom, 
and personal privacy. Many know that their parents cannot claim ownership of the online space 
and so they enter the online space with the purpose of expressing their genuine selves. 
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CHAPTER VI: DIFFERENT, YET THE SAME: GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
 Although all users of color interact with the white space, whether they respond to it de-
pends on their perceptions of privacy, their sense of justice, and their level of empowerment. 
When examining the interviews of this study’s participants, I noticed a trend; those who were 
Millennials, or older, tended to be very concerned about justice in the online space, and those 
who were Generation Z did not express much concern. This chapter explores how participants 
perceptions of privacy effects their digital privacy strategies. I argue that how participants think 
of privacy affects the privacy strategies they employ as well as the rationalizations they use to 
justify their practices. Interestingly, all participants expressed some understanding of privacy in 
the online space, but all did not express a right to privacy in the online space. This study assumes 
that a disbelief in privacy precludes feelings of unjust or just monitoring in the online space. Fur-
thermore, the extent of the perception of a right to privacy affects what forms of justice are con-
ceived by participants when presented with what I call a disprivacy event: an event in which the 
participant has been asked to abdicate a degree of their privacy or an event in which the partici-
pant’s privacy has been usurped. Two groups emerge when examining direct statements on pri-
vacy along with comments on terms of service agreements: Millenials and Generation X versus 
Generation Z. 
A Right to Privacy 
 Many older Back participants (Millennials and older) construct their sense of privacy 
from their understanding of the online space as one that is structured and hierarchical. This may 
stem from their upbringing, such as in a Black household, however many of the participants and 
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others who I engaged with in conversation about my research who were not Black expressed a 
similar form of trauma.) From the perspective of these older Black participants, people in the on-
line space have rights; there are laws and rules; and there are adjudicators (institutions, groups, 
and individuals), just as in the offline world. Millennials and older generations understand that 
the systems of the online space are just as imperfect and malleable as those in the offline space. 
This assumption of imperfection allows them to perceive instances of justice and injustice in the 
online space. They do not take a platform’s word on anything. I asked Ery what was the first 
thing that comes to mind when they hear digital privacy, and they responded, “Like, all the ways 
that [it] can be violated or ways that our online activity is being monitored without our direct 
knowledge. And Facebook definitely comes to mind.” 
 In just two sentences, Ery reveals that they believe there is such a thing as privacy in the 
online space, expresses notions of justice and injustice in relation to privacy, and identifies the 
perpetrators of disprivacy.  Ery believes there is a right to privacy in the online space but ex-
presses that it is precarious and endangered by the machinations of the space’s ruling institutions. 
Ery also alludes to a conceptualization of justice when it comes to privacy that relies on notice or 
communication of action; this is recognizably procedural justice. Injustice in the online space is 
not equated simply with being monitored from Ery’s perspective; instead, being monitored with-
out due consultation and notification is unjust. 
 Hione similarly cites infractions to digital privacy as her first thought when asked directly 
about digital privacy. Later in our discussion when discussing the dissemination of school com-
puters for at home student use, Hione asserts a right to not be monitored: “If you’re using a per-
sonal computer, then [the school] shouldn’t have a right to monitor you.” In this case, Hione de-
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termines the justness of schools monitoring students (and possibly parents) on laptops at home 
via a material wellness framework. She rationalizes that since the users of a school provided lap-
top receive some benefit, they potentially cede the right to privacy. However, in the case of using 
a personal laptop (to complete the schoolwork), the invasion of privacy would be unacceptable; 
there is no proportional benefit to the students. 
 Ayan is a Japanese immigrant who has lived most of his life in the U.S. Although he ac-
cepts the pronoun “he”, Ayan identifies as non-binary. He is passionate about activism and is a 
tireless educator who focuses on helping his students think critically. He is at the tail end of Gen-
eration X and barely has an online presence. However, this was not always the case. Ayan used to 
use all of the major social media platforms, but he states that his experiences online and offline 
have contributed to his self-deplatforming. In a impassioned conversation about terms of service 
agreements, Ayan passionately talked at length about his perception of the online space, whether 
people have a right to privacy, and how people’s right to privacy is being stripped away. 
I think it's intentionally cumbersome for us to figure all this out. It's always 
changing. Our user agreements are always changing. The things in the fine print, 
you know, our rights, consumer rights, user rights, etc. It's constantly changing. 
And it's not just in physical fine print, but it's also in big words, which, you know, 
attorneys, corporate attorneys, IP attorneys are intentionally wording things a cer-
tain way so they have a margin of rights or a margin of power that they can oper-
ate in. 
 Later in the interview, Ayan goes on to connect the problems of the online space to larger 
problems with governance in the American system. He perceives injustice in the online space as 
supporting “real world” injustice and vice-versa. He vehemently believes that people have a right 
to privacy in the online space, but he is soberingly aware that every day it is becoming more dif-
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ficult to operationalize, let alone conceptualize, privacy while being online. He believes pro-
cedural justice is effervescent unless were act quickly. 
 Leone is a Black man born and raised on the South Side of Chicago. Like many there, he 
has a strong drive to leave his mark on the world. He is a millennial, but he is already a school 
principal. He participated in the study with some trepidation. He had many questions. He says “I 
like to do my homework!” He uses many of the major social media platforms and phone apps. 
 When asked about digital privacy, he is more hesitant than other participants to admit that 
it exists. Eventually in our conversation, he started to speak of privacy in the online space, and he 
even alluded to his belief in a right to privacy. The conversation vacillated between major 
breaches committed by hackers and social media platforms sharing data with the government. 
When asked which he was more concerned about, the government or hackers, Leone told me: 
 I'm equally worried about either one of them. I think that what I worry about with 
a  hacker is that they can easily distribute your information and more or less ruin 
your life,  anything that you have on your digital platform that your trying to keep 
private. You know, and in our society, you're guilty until you prove yourself inno-
cent. What I worry about with the government is that the government encroaching 
and having broad sweeping powers to do whatever they want to with your data, 
your metadata. I just feel like it’s an encroachment on privacy, and I also think 
that it will lead to a slippery slope where it becomes big brother-ish. 
 By stating that the government would be encroaching upon an individual’s privacy, 
Leone reveals that he does believe there is an individual right to some form of privacy in the on-
line space; though, the extent of that privacy is not something that Leone has decided. 
 Millennials believe that privacy in the online space exists, there is a right to privacy for 
all users, there are systems that assign and manage online privacy — which both intersect and 
are undefended from larger structures in society, and violating the right to privacy is unjust. They 
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feel that individuals have power in the online space, although this is fleeting. And they do not 
understand the internet to be an innate institution; It has a history and a trajectory. There is a pos-
sibility that the online space could look completely different than it does now in the future. 
A Right or a Rite? 
 Younger participants, who mostly align with the increasingly used Generation Z and 
Zoomer generational name, conceive of online disprivacy as a rite of passage that leads to social 
and economic benefit. They have concerns about privacy, but the younger participants from this 
generation generally do not understand the problem of privacy in terms of procedural justice like 
older participants. Instead, they examine the online environment with a sense of concern about 
distributive justice; they are concerned that they get something of value in turn for disprivacy, 
and most of them are currently content with the tradeoff. Through this study I have found that 
younger participants believe there is an equitable tradeoff with platforms for their disprivacy, the 
focus of their concerns about online safety is other persons in the online space. 
 Cosan is a current undergraduate student and is one of the younger participants in the 
study. He spends a great deal of his free time in the online space. He uses major platforms such 
as Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok daily. When asked about privacy in the online space, he chal-
lenged that there is such a thing. Cosan studies cybersecurity, and from his perspective, the major 
platforms already know what they are interested in knowing about the majority of people. He 
expressed that he was fine with this situation; although, he wished it could be different. Cosan 
says that he feels the constant surveillance by platforms is a benefit to him. Instead of seeing ads 
for products that he has no interest in, he gets ads only for things he actually cares about. The 
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same goes for news stories and alerts. And because the platforms know him well, Cosan feels 
that they can introduce him to new things that he would not have discovered on his own. 
 However, when the topic turns to other people in the online space Cosan feels very dif-
ferently. Cosan speaks emphatically of his experience being harassed by a white female co-
worker. She first found him on LinkedIn where he felt comfortable being connected to her; he 
felt in control. However, soon she began finding all of his social media accounts, even those that 
had no easy association to him. Cosan said this made him worry. 
 She would share personal information of other employees very personal informa-
tion to me or other employees, which I do not consider as ok. Because it’s not for 
her to share that information. It’s not her choice. Now, I feel bad for the person 
that trusted her with that information, And I would not share my personal infor-
mation with her. Thats the reason why I did not accept her invite on my [other] 
social media. Because I never know what could be used against me. 
 In a subsequent conversation, Cosan talked at length about the precariousness of being a 
minority. A major contributor to his anxiety about his coworker stalking his “private social me-
dia” (Cosan uses this to differentiate with what he considers public social media, such as 
LinkedIn) was the power differences between different racial groups. 
 Roi recently graduated from a four year university. He frames the benefits of disprivacy 
at the societal level. People who are in accidents can be located easily, traffic can be routed 
around accidents, data can be used to track pandemics. However, he admits that he stopped play-
ing Pokemon Go because of his concern at developers hiding surveillance measures in the app 
options. He feels uncomfortable with all of the things in the terms of service that he agrees with, 
but he still has social media accounts. He sites social reasons, but also emphasizes the potential 
career benefits of digital participation. 
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 To be honest, I don't really like deplatform myself, I try not to put up anything 
that I would ever feel like I needed to take down. I try to think that out ahead of 
time and actually use it to my advantage. Having no online presence actually does 
play to your disadvantage, especially in the modern world. So unfortunately, you 
know, we we have to think about how we craft an image of ourselves. And, you 
know, it's actually helped me lead to jobs. It's, it's been wonderful. But I have to 
be, you know, thoughtful about how I do that. I can't be like putting up there, you 
know, hey, I totally just got blasted this weekend. I'm so drunk right now and 
sending pictures, you know, flashing the White House or something. I don't know. 
But you know, at the same time, I put out there productive things that I am doing 
within my own work fields and really help strengthen the identity for myself and 
build up consumer confidence in a way. So I've never come off of a platform. 
 While Roi finds the actions of major platforms to be suspicious, manipulative, and inva-
sive, he does not leave these platforms. Instead, he believes that he can navigate them effectively 
by cultivating the “right” online image. He does this because, as he says, he has achieved career 
benefits from the online space. This shows that he is mainly concerned about distributive justice 
in the online environment. He cares about how much benefit he reaps versus the trade off in dis-
privacy. While he expresses concern at major platforms information gathering practices, his pri-
vacy concerns revolve around managing and maintaining interpersonal relationships. With one 
exception, he did admit to deleting the Pokemon Go app because of concerns of being listened to 
and watched covertly. 
 Jody is a current undergraduate student at a pricey private four-year university. This con-
trasts their humble upbringing on the South Side of Chicago as a young Latino. He grew up in 
Little Village, and, as they say, he feels proud of his neighborhood, his people, and thimself. He 
has already made a huge impact in their community via their volunteering and leadership. As an 
avid debater, Jody is used to reading and processing many pages of information for the purpose 
of taking a position to argue; though this is what he said about terms of service agreements. 
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 I guess we’re so attracted to what platforms bring, that we don’t care about what 
those repercussions are. Because they way that these platforms are promoted, and 
it’s like they’re so big and shiny and bright and so attractive that everyone just 
wants to be on them. Do you honestly think people are going to take the time to 
read [the terms of service]? 
 Jody brazenly admits that he does not read the terms of service agreements for social me-
dia platforms. He also alludes that joining social media for him was about following and finding 
community. In other words, he eschews access to procedural justice for potential distributive jus-
tice. For him the benefit is social. He does feel that platforms should be more transparent in the 
rights they steal from their customers, and he agrees with increasing discussions that terms of 
service agreements be simplified to increase readability for the average user. 
 Younger participants in this study conceive of privacy in the online environment very dif-
ferently than their millennial counterparts. They are not as concerned with institutions compro-
mising their privacy; instead, they are more concerned about other individuals in the online 
space. They believe that individuals are more likely to have a negative impact on their digital 
privacy. When it comes to major platforms, they are more concerned with distributive justice. 
They want to know that there is some explicit proportional benefit to having their privacy invad-
ed by the major platforms. Younger participants seem more concerned with filtering their online 
presence because of their wariness of other people, but they are less likely to actually leave plat-
forms or challenge their practices because they are scared of compromising the social and eco-
nomic benefits they believe they will reap. The way that younger participants in this study think 
about the online space and digital privacy is like a rite of passage. They believe that disprivacy 
because of the practices of major platforms is unavoidable. They believe that there is a correct 
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way to navigate the online space that requires sacrifice, but at some point there will be a return 
on the sacrifice. 
Two Houses 
 When looking at the privacy strategies employed by the seventeen study participants, 
there is a trend for older participants; they block [contact management], curate their posts [access 
setting], and some eventually self-deplatform [privacy setting] if the two previous strategies do 
not work to secure them digital privacy — eight participants in this study revealed that they hey 
self-deplatformed; they were all millennial or older participants. Younger participants, Genera-
tion Z, very meticulously curate certain content [access setting]. The participants in my study 
who were younger did not block much [contact management] and none self-deplatformed [priva-
cy setting] from a major social media platform. None of the seventeen formal participants in this 
study, or others who were informally interviewed, revealed that purposeful aliasing [identity 
masking] was part of their privacy repertoire. 
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
 Millennials and Generation Z participants in this study think of the online space in very 
different ways. Millennials come to the online space with specific intergenerational knowledge 
that shapes their perceptions of justice and choice of privacy strategies in the online space. Gen-
erations Z participants did not seem to have or apply said knowledge when understanding the 
online space and choosing privacy strategies. Millennials found safety in the online space by 
self-deplatforming from major social media platforms while Generation Z denied self-deplat-
forming as a valid method of attaining safety. Instead, they focused on fostering very specific 
online identities through content curation. Regardless, the collective experiences of this study’s 
participants point to the reality for many people of color in the online space; they do not feel 
safe. 
 These feelings point to a more fundamental divide in the online space that has largely 
been minimized by theorists of the digital divide. Race is still a problem in the online space and 
functions to empower and disempower certain people online. More often than not, people of col-
or are disempowered. Theorists of the internet and the digital divide ignore or are unable to see 
this because most of the research is quantitative. The results of this qualitative study support the 
critical criticism of digital divide research and theorizing by Greene (2016), Selwyn (2004), 
Stevenson (2009), and Wacquant (2009); theorists of the digital divide have minimized the fun-
damental issues of the online space with respect to race. Instead, they constantly reify the divide 
as a technology and knowledge problem because they are ingrained within neoliberal investment 
interests which are preference delivering cheap labor to the marketplace. The participants experi-
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ences shared in this study reinforce the necessity to approach the digital divide in a way that is 
human-centered and not laden with corporate interests. 
 In addition to exploring the informal ways in which the digital privacy strategies of the 
people of color who participated in this study were formed, I asked about formal education relat-
ed to digital privacy. I asked participants if their education had helped them to understand the 
online environment and how to find safety within it. Almost all of the participants revealed that 
they did not receive any guidance from their educational institution. Some revealed that they 
learned about how to navigate the online space from their parents, others recognized that their 
privacy behaviors, and those of others, are potentially influenced by norm entrepreneurs in the 
online space — youtubers, streamers, influencers. This suggests that some are learning about 
digital privacy and how to think about the online space from the very entities which have an in-
centive in normalizing easily exploitable behaviors. For Millenials, intergenerational adaptations 
passed down from their parents through child rearing and storytelling becomes vital in helping 
them to navigate the online space. For Generation Z, despite equally desiring this information, 
they do not have it. Integrating the history of the internet and basic internet privacy techniques 
into coursework would go a long way to helping those who most need and desire this informa-
tion. And even though white people are not the primary focus of this specific research, they stand 
to benefit from learning about the history of oppression in the online space as well. So, those 
who are interested in fighting for justice, equality, and equity do not inadvertently commit the 
same offense as the streamer for the Zack and Matt show. 
 The experiences presented in this study provide a glimpse of the glaring trajectory from 
intergeneration Black trauma to online behaviors by people of color. Though the participants 
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clearly experienced and continue to experience hurt, the picture is not black and white. The 
trauma they experienced manifests as a potential advantage in the digital space. For this reason, I 
refer to intergenerational trauma when focusing on the personal experiences, and I use other 
terms when theorizing on the effect on digital safety.  
 People of color are leaving the online space, and when they remain they are transient and 
nomadic. They cannot currently find privacy: online safety. Of this, Morales et al (2016) says 
“digital participation hinges on social political interpretation” of the online space (111). Whether 
one participates and how one participates in the online environment is based on how they per-
ceive its existence. For many of the older people of color participants in this study, the online 
space increasingly supports regimes of oppression. Although we are in the in-between where as a 
tool the internet is still invaluable to social justice movements, self-expression, and self-actual-
ization, many older participants (Millennials and older) wonder how long we have before we are 
the ones being moved, told what to express, and told what we are by social media — if we are 
not already. For many, these fears have driven them to leave major social media platforms and 
increasingly resign from major social media platforms. The understanding of the online space is 
very different for Generation Z. They see the online space with the gaze of possibility. This study 
suggests this may be because of a lack of recognition of the tools of oppression. Perhaps, this is 
because many younger participants do not carry the intergenerational trauma of older participants 
— for what reason that may be is outside the scope of this study. Perhaps, their inability to see 
oppression in the online space is linked to an erasure of the history of the internet, the history of 
minorities and the internet, the history of Black people and the internet, the history of Black peo-
ple, Period! A single participants, Anha, said that she received applicable guidance on navigating 
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the online space in her education. The rest were either educated by their intergenerational trau-
ma, which both protects and weighs on them, or they received nothing at all. Without the history 
of the internet and its use as a tool of oppression, which involves all of us and belongs to all of 
us, younger participants who increasingly constitute the online space are yielding leverage to the 
oppressors. In a “deal with a devil”, they trade privacy for benefits they may never reap. This is 
because the very commodities they seek to exploit, their Blackness, their exoticness, their dispri-
vacy, endangers them. And for those who can endure, the return on disprivacy in the online space 
is increasingly small. 
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APPENDIX A: ETHNOGRAPHIC INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Would you like to participate in this recorded interview? 
2. Please tell me about your daily computer use. 
3. If someone says digital privacy, what is the first thing that comes to mind? Why? 
4. Has someone ever viewed your digital content when your didn’t want them to view it? 
1. What did you do to prevent it from happening again? 
2. Did you change your online presence or behavior? 
3. Who or what did you turn to for advice on preventing this from occurring again? 
5. How safe do you feel in an online environment? 
6. Please tell me about a time when you: 
1. Left and online platform 
2. Blocked someone online 
3. Second-guessed or restricted posting something online 
4. Used an online persona 
7. What do you think of creators who post their entire lives online? Friend and family? 
8. Do you think that school has prepared you or informed your decision making on digital pri-
vacy? If so, in what ways? 
9. Who do you think worries about online privacy? Why? 
10. What do you think of major data breaches? 
11. Do you think your digital presence affects your ability to be successful after school? 
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The participants will participate in an online multi-stage one session interview conducted via 
Zoom or Skype. They will go through the following interview program in sequential order. 
• Ethnographic interview (30 - 45 min): The participant will be asked predetermined open- 
ended questions by the Co-PI (Denavious Hoover). The questions will investigate their 
perceptions of privacy in the online environment and how they turn those perceptions into 
practice. 
• Profile-Elicitation (4 profiles; one for each strategy) (5 - 15 min): Participants will be 
shown 4 completely fictitious social media profiles via screen-share. They will be asked to 
critique/analyze and provide general comments on the profiles. Participants will also be 
asked to compare and contrast the profiles on levels of privacy. 
• Auto-Ethnographic Question (writing): Participants will be prompted with the 
following: "You are a stranger that has gained access to the whole of your online data 
without restriction. Describe what you see in one or more paragraphs." They will then be 
asked to write a paragraph or two describing their online presence from an outside posi-
tionality. The writing will be collected and become part of their interview response. 
After participants have completed all three stages of the interview, the interview will end. 
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APPENDIX B: PROFILE-ELICITATION MATERIALS 
 
	 92
 
	 93
 
	 94
	 95
